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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ROLE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN POST-CONFLICT 
PEACEBUILDING 
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M.A. Thesis 
Thesis Supervisor: Emre Hatipoğlu 
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Civil wars and political violence can be ended by an agreement or ceasefire, sustainable 
peace, however, requires much more steps in the transition from war to peace. In a large 
extent the success of such transition depends on the success of economic recovery of a 
post-conflict country. Foreign direct investment is one of the main factors that can 
facilitate such recovery; however, the effects of such investment on the post-conflict 
peace are not clear. In order to understand the effects of the foreign direct investment on 
post-conflict peacebuilding, this thesis presents a rational choice model of strategic 
interactions between the state, the rebels and a foreign investor. The propositions of the 
model are illustrated with real life examples derived from Niger, Nigeria and Turkey. 
Finally, this paper argues that the most positive impact on peace is likely to be produced 
by FDI with high and positive economic externalities valued by the local population 
even higher than the redistribution policies of the state. Other possible equilibriums, 
however, lead either to recurrence of conflict in the short run, in case if revenue 
distribution activities of the government will threat the legitimacy of rebels, or to 
sustenance of the truce in the short run but exacerbation of the latent conflict. Based on 
these finding this paper provides several policy recommendations which according to 
this thesis can be potentially interesting and beneficial for both investors and policy 
makers.  
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ÖZET 
 
UYUġMAZLIK SONRASI BARIġ ĠNġASINDA DOĞRUDAN YABANCI 
YATIRIMIN ROLÜ 
 
Evgeniia Shahin 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi 
Tez DanıĢmanı: Emre Hatipoğlu 
 
Anahtar Sözcükleri: UyuĢmazlık Sonrası, BarıĢ ĠnĢası, Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırım 
 
Ġç savaĢlar ve siyasi Ģiddet anlaĢma veya ateĢkes ile sonlandırılabilir, halbuki 
sürdürülebilir barıĢ, savaĢtan barıĢa geçiĢ süresince çok daha fazla adım gerektirebilir. 
Böyle geçiĢin baĢarısı büyük ölçüde uyuĢmazlık sonrası ülkedeki ekonomik düzelmenin 
baĢarısına bağlıdır. Böyle bir düzenlemeyi kolaylaĢtırabilen önemli faktörlerden biri de 
doğrudan yabancı yatırımdır; fakat bu tür yatırımların uyuĢmazlık sonrası barıĢa olan 
etkisi net değildir. Bu tez, doğrudan yabancı yatırımın uyuĢmazlık sonrası barıĢ 
inĢaasına olan etkisini anlamak için devlet, isyancı ve yatırımcı arasındaki stratejik 
etkileĢimin rasyonel seçim modelini sunmaktadır. Bu modelin önermeleri Nijer, Nijerya 
ve Türkiye vakalarından çıkarılan gerçek hayat örnekleri ile örneklendirilmiĢtir.  Son 
olarak, bu makale, yerel halk tarafından devletin gerçekleĢtiği yeniden bölüĢümden 
daha önemli olarak görülen  pozitif ekonomik dıĢsallıklara sahip olan doğrudan yabancı 
yatırımın barıĢ için en olumlu etkiyi sağladığını ileri sürmektedir. Oysa diğer olası 
denge durumları, devletin bölüĢüm faaliyetleri isyancıların meĢruiyetini tehdit ediyorsa 
uyuĢmazlığın kısa vadede yenilenmesine yol açabileceği gibi, kısa vadede ateĢkes 
sürdürülüyor olsa da gizli uyuĢmazlığın Ģiddetlenmesine neden olabilir. Bu bulgulara 
dayanarak iĢbu makale, hem yatırımcılar hem de karar alıcılar için ilginç ve faydalı 
olabilecek birkaç politika önerisini sunmaktadır.  
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CHAPTER 1.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
While a violent conflict can be ended by an agreement, stable peace requires much 
longer time, commitment and efforts from the conflicting parties and outsiders. 
Weakened by civil wars, post-conflict countries have to work hard to maintain and 
strengthen fragile peace.  Such countries face a risk of conflict recurrence if parties are 
dissatisfied with the post-conflict conditions (Walter, 2004), old issues are not fully 
resolved or opportunity costs of war change in favor of conflict (Walter, 2010). 
Prevention of such risks and tackling economic grievances which are among the major 
causes for intra-state conflict (Collier, 2000; Griffiths, 2013; Hacioğlu, Dinçer, & Çelik, 
2012) and its recurrence (Walter 2004) is especially difficult under the conditions of 
collapsed economy, destroyed infrastructure (Bray, 2009, p. 5) and fragile public 
institutions (Yelpaala, 2010).  Similarly, businesses are deprived of economic and 
human capital (Yelpaala, 2010)  to conduct healthy operations. Therefore, post-conflict 
regions require immediate investment to transform the region into a sustainable 
economy and polity. Such dire needs for investment often, however, cannot be funded 
by local investors in the region. Moreover, international credits also are hardly available 
for such regions, and often the main source of private capital in post-conflict countries 
comes from foreign direct investment (The World Bank, 2011a). Furthermore, the 
impact of such investment on the post-conflict peace-building is controversial – while 
private sector may provide services and linkages necessary to rebuild peaceful relations 
it also can reinforce war economy and lead to renewal of violence (Berdal & 
Mousavizadeh, 2010).  
Little work has focused on the role FDI plays in consolidating peace in a post-
conflict environment and especially on the conditions under which such investment 
contributes to peace or fuels a conflict. While foreign investment may create new jobs 
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and increase standards of living (Hacioğlu et al., 2012), it may also lead to unequal 
distribution of the benefits from investment through corrupted networks (Yelpaala, 
2010) and create new or exacerbate old inequalities (Rothgeb, 1991). Some suggest that 
investors in post-conflict countries should implement policies contributing to income 
equality and increase of living standards of local population (Bray, 2009). However, as 
most likely investors in post-conflict countries are those from countries with ‘weaker 
institutions and less concern about corporate social responsibility’(Driffield, Jones, & 
Crotty, 2012), the expectation of an investor to solve economic problems in a post-
conflict country may not hold. 
How does, then, the involvement of outside investors affect peace-building in a 
post-conflict society? In this paper we argue and theoretically demonstrate that 
decisions of such large investors are often crucial for the fragile balance of power in a 
post-civil war country. We will show that foreign direct investment can influence post-
conflict country as (i) a legitimacy mechanism, (ii) a commitment mechanism, (iii) an 
incentivizing mechanism and as (iv) an opportunity cost mechanism influencing all 
three determinants of conflict recurrence stated above.  
FDI has a potential of increasing or decreasing legitimacy of government and 
local rebels in dependence on the policies regarding foreign investors implemented by 
the government and on the policies of redistribution or not redistribution of revenues 
accrued by government from FDI. Acting as a commitment mechanism, FDI may 
reflect and increase governmental commitment to peace as recurrence of violence would 
damage image of the government in eyes of international community and thus endanger 
later financing. At the same time FDI may make previous commitments obsolete by 
changing the balance of power between the parties and increasing opportunity cost of 
war for one of the parties, thus triggering defection of peace by one of the parties before 
the power is shifted.  As an incentivizing mechanism FDI may create incentive for 
government to keep peace in order to guarantee government’s revenues related to FDI 
as in case of war foreign investors are likely to quit the country or at least to suspend 
their operations. Finally acting as an opportunity cost mechanism, FDI can create such 
economic externalities for local population as employment
1
, improvement in 
infrastructure or provision of vital services and, thus, foster support for peace and 
                                                          
1 The role of employment as an instrument to create opportunity cost for population and prevent their joining the 
rebel forces is defined by Hanson, Iyegar and Monten (2011). The authors argue that through such mechanism higher 
employment tends to reduce events of violence (Hanson, Iyegar, & Monten, 2011).  
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existing order by the population as recurrence of war is likely to lead to eliminate 
operations and such externalities of FDI. 
Considering the possibility of mixed effects of FDI, one should also ask whether a 
foreign investor may deliberately influence the direction of the impact of investment. 
Indeed multiple policy-recommendations and analyses argue that if a foreign company 
brings investment of a certain type, organizes own relations with society with view to 
sustain peace (Campbell & Carment, N.D.), and operate in a mostly beneficial for local 
community framework (Yelpaala, 2010) or adhere to corporate social responsibility 
(Webb, 2009). Justified by such assumptions United Nation organization Global 
Compact launched in 2013 a Business for Peace Initiative aiming to promote peace 
oriented behavior of multi-national corporations in the host countries of FDI (Global 
Compact, 2013, p. 3).  
In the following sections we will, firstly, present the conditions of post-conflict 
countries and of war recurrence, and the determinants and effects of foreign direct 
investment. Then we will present a theoretical model using a population-centric view of 
insurgency and explaining the strategic interactions between government, rebels and 
FDI with regards to population’s support for the government or rebels taking in account 
economic effects of FDI as well. In the third section we will construct a game-theoretic 
model showing the rationale for such interactions and testing hypothesis derived from 
the theory. In the fourth part we will present a multi-case study illustrating interactions 
presented by the model and finally we will conclude our paper and present 
recommendations for future academic research and policy makers.  
This research is particularly important from both academic and policy making 
views as it may bring clarity into the theoretical ambiguity on the impacts of FDI on the 
post-conflict peace building, while at the same time provide some suggestions for more 
effective peace-building strategies.  
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CHAPTER 2.  
CONCEPTS AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Post-Conflict Countries and War Recurrence 
a) Post-Conflict Countries and Peacebuilding 
One of the ways to approach a concept of post-conflict country is to see it as a 
country being in a process of transition from intra-state war/conflict to peace (Brown, 
Langer, & Stewart, 2011). Another definition formulated by Junne and Verokren (2005) 
sees post-conflict stage as a ‘conflict situation in which open warfare has come to an 
end’, though the relations remain ‘tense’ (Women Win, N.D.). Both approaches 
underline that such transition (or conflict stage) is often interrupted by sparks of 
violence or recurrence of war. Moreover, a post-conflict period may include multiple 
steps of peace building including signing of agreements, ending of violence, 
disarmament, state building, social integration and many others (Brown et al., 2011).  
Post-conflict countries may differ according to the levels of economic and human 
development, owning of natural resources, existing inequalities and capacity of political 
institutions  (Brown et al., 2011).  
However, despite some internal differentiations post-conflict countries are 
‘fundamentally different’ from stable developing states (USAID, 2009). Post-conflict 
countries can be characterized by fragmented societies, unresolved issues of previous 
conflict, presence of mobilized and armed groups and collapsed or damaged systems of 
governance and destroyed infrastructure and human and physical capital (UNDP, 2010). 
Other common features of these countries include lack of security, high unemployment, 
weak administrative capacity of the state, hardships experienced by women and 
presence of external parties, such as donors or aid organizations with different and 
sometimes conflicting agendas (USAID, 2009, p. 5). In comparison to other countries 
such conflict induced problems make it more difficult for post-conflict states to 
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establish effective state structure and increase own level of economic and human 
development.  
In order to tackle these problems and to sustain peace, states have to focus on 
reconstruction, reconciliation and development. Reconstruction activities are necessary 
to improve life conditions and motivate economic recovery. Reconciliation is necessary 
to transform hostile relations between different groups into more harmonious and 
constructive ones. Developmental programs in turn are initiated to ensure sustainability 
of post-conflict peace after donors and aid often given to a country immediately after 
settlement are withdrawn.  
However, such goals are hardly possible with collapsed economies and low state 
capacities. On this stage peacebuilding activities are implemented in order to sustain 
peace and help states to improve own capacities. Peacebuilding in turn can be defined as 
‘identification and support of measures needed for transformation toward more 
sustainable, peaceful relationships and structures of governance’ aiming to prevent 
conflict recurrence (UNDESA, n.d.).  Such activities include ‘demobilization and 
reintegration of soldiers, de-mining, emergency relief and food aid, to the repair of 
roads and infrastructure’ (Bigombe, Collier, & Sambanis, 2000, p. 326)   Improving of 
state capacity is crucial as it relates to legitimacy of a state and its effectiveness (UNDP, 
2010). State’s legitimacy, in turn, is partly dependent on the state’s ability to address 
infrastructural problems and state service related needs of citizens (UNDP, 2010).  
b) Causes of Conflict Recurrence 
Though description of post-conflict countries presented above shows their 
vulnerability and weaknesses, it does not explain why parties, which have reached a 
settlement even under such grave conditions, may prefer to use violence again. Existing 
literature presents multiple explanations for duration of post-conflict peace and conflict 
recurrence.  
Some argue that the duration of post-conflict peace is dependent on the duration 
(DeRouen, Bercovitch, & Wei, 2009) of or the concentration of violence (Morey, 2009, 
p. 336) during the preceding conflict.  Alternative explanation proposes that rebels’ 
victory or negotiated settlements tend to result in a more sustainable peace in the long 
run, while governments may maintain peace only if they are able to address grievances 
and ensure economic wellbeing of the population supporting or having potential to 
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support or join rebels (Mason, Gurses, Brandt, & more.. 2011, pp. 182,187). In contrast 
other studies show that military victories with support of peacekeeping operations and 
power-sharing agreements are likely to lead to longer peace comparatively to that 
following negotiated agreements (Ohmura, 2011), while power-sharing agreements 
alone are also found to lead to longer peace (Hartzell, 2009; Hoddie & Hartzell, 2003) 
in some cases and to undermine duration of peace if they are too difficult to implement 
(DeRouen, Lea, & Wallensteen, 2009). 
Other scholars link the duration of post-conflict peace to the inclusivity of peace 
settlements (Nilsson, 2012), relation in post-conflict settings between the state and the 
ethnic group who acted as opposition and economic and political discrimination of such 
ethnic group (Mehmet Gurses & Rost, 2013) or individual dissatisfaction, hardships and 
inability to change such conditions (Walter, 2004). Moreover, such factor as high 
dependence on natural resources can lead to criminal or political rebel activity, while 
lack of alternative economic opportunities and ethnic dominance (with 45-80% of 
population being from the same ethnic group) constitute just another potential for 
conflict (Bigombe et al., 2000, p. 326). Economic grievances in particular are seen as a 
major cause of civil conflicts and (Collier, 2000; Griffiths, 2013; Hacioğlu et al., 2012) 
and their recurrence (Walter 2004) 
External impacts might influence, positively or negatively, the chances for the 
recurrence of a conflict as well. External actors joining the conflict or post-conflict 
settlement are likely to introduce change in the status quo or the perception of status 
quo. Changes in material conditions or relations might lead equally to conflict initiation, 
mitigation or transformation (Mitchell, 2005). In contrast changes in expectations under 
constant material conditions might lead to the feeling of relative deprivation and thus 
spark a conflict (Pruitt & Kim, 2004). On the other hand, relational changes such as 
creation of new ties or increase of mutual trust might help to achieve conflict 
transformation (Kriesberg, 2011).   
Such relational changes prolonging peace can be related to the effects of 
mediation (M Gurses, Rost, & McLeod, 2008), or peacekeeping efforts (Fortna, 2003, 
2004; Hoffmann & Schaffer, 2009; Jung, 2006; Mason et al., 2011). Such third-party 
interventions may influence the duration of post-conflict peace through increasing trust 
in the possibility of peace and thus reduce the credible commitment problem. An 
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external factor that may change material conditions related to power balance or its 
perception and thus put initial peace deal in danger is humanitarian aid; however, such 
negative effect of aid is most likely in cases that ended with decisive victory, while aid 
is least likely to decrease the span of peace after ‘truce, negotiated settlement or military 
stalemate’ (Narang, 2014, p. 458).  
Investment and particularly foreign investments into a post-conflict economy also 
constitute a type of third-party intervention into post-conflict situation and may 
potentially influence the peace or recurrence of conflict between the parties. Foreign 
investment is seen by some as an ‘engine for economic development’ (Appel & Loyle, 
2012) so necessary for development of state capacity and for tackling economic 
hardships, which are often cited among the main reasons for conflict recurrence and 
endurance.   
2.2. Post-Conflict Economy and Investment 
 a) Post-conflict Economy 
The literature mentioned above highlights that economic conditions tend to have 
an impact on conflict recurrence and that such needs should be tackled in order to build 
sustainable peace. Economy is particularly important for post-conflict countries as even 
after settlements economies still experience such economic shocks such as ‘brain drain 
and capital flight’ (Yelpaala, 2010) due to real or perceived lack of safety and economic 
prospects. Conflicts impose such damages on economy as loss of human capital due to 
death and migration of people, destruction of property and due to the transfer of 
economic resources during the war-time ‘from productive investment in human and 
physical capital to that of destructive military activities’ (Hanna, Hammoud, & Russo-
Converso, 2014). 
While conflicts often lead economy of a country into a crisis, recovery of such 
economy to its pre-conflict level may not be optimal as most conflict countries had 
‘flaws’ in their economies even before internal conflicts had broken out (Bray, 2009). 
Such flaws might include extensive centralization, wealth monopolization and unequal 
distribution of resources and the like (Bray, 2009, p. 3). Thus, a post-conflict economy 
might need to develop in a direction different from that followed before the conflict. 
However, developing economic sector in such countries is particularly difficult as the 
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main source of private capital in conflict affected countries is FDI as international 
credits are mostly not available for such risky regions (The World Bank, 2011a, p. 34).  
Moreover, FDI in such countries plays an important role in ‘capital formation’ 
substituting for the lacking capital and inventories (The World Bank, 2011a, p. 34). 
Existence of such private capital is important for diversification of economic activities 
and thus decrease of economic risks and development of sustainable economy (The 
World Bank, 2011b, p. 50).  
However other problems of post-conflict countries create obstacles for FDI as 
well. Once conflict ends, post-conflict countries often find their public institutions at 
least partly dysfunctional or fully collapsed (Yelpaala, 2010). Maintaining political 
stability is just another problematic feature of post-conflict conflicts, as such countries 
may experience continuation of security and regulation problems, corruption or poor 
infrastructure (Bray, 2009, p. 5) An example for such conditions provides Bosnia and 
Herzegovina witnessing calls of separation of some of its regional entities, legitimacy 
problems of different governmental bodies and risks of fragmentation (Zelenaj, Beriker, 
& Hatipoglu, Forthcoming). 
These additional problems tend to constitute obstacles for economic development 
and create additional risks and costs for investors. The next section will present why 
despite such risks investors might still be interested in entering in a post-conflict 
economy and what the general determinants of FDI inflows in a country are. 
Investment and particularly foreign direct investments can sometimes constitute a 
source for economic recovery and development (Dollar & Kraay, 2001). Economic 
recovery, in turn, leads to an ‘increase in employment and income level’ and is linked to 
the lower risk of future conflicts (Hacioğlu et al., 2012). On the other hand, activities in 
private sector sometimes may increase the risk of conflict by creating tensions between 
groups unevenly benefiting from the economic recovery induced by businesses (Bray, 
2009, p. 17). Moreover, natural resources FDI entering a post-conflict country may lead 
to capital flight or the ‘wrong type’ of FDI or cause such problems as the Dutch 
Disease
2
 or resource curse leading to further stagnation of domestic economic sector 
                                                          
2  ‘Dutch disease ’ refers to a situation when in a country rich with natural resources, resource-led exports lead to 
appreciation of the domestic currency’s real exchange rate, ‘contraction of the traded sector and expansion of non-
traded sectors’ (Van der Ploeg, 2011, p. 122). Such situation makes manufactured goods less competitive on a global 
market and can eventually lead to stagnation of the whole productive sector. The first country to experience such 
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and thus increasing the risk of conflict recurrence. Nigerian conflict exemplifies such 
risk as even after an amnesty program and demilitarization process initiated in 2009 
separate attacks by the militant group MEND on oil facilities ("Nigeria's Mend militants 
claim oil pipeline attack," 2010) and against police forces ("Nigerian 'Mend' militants 
claim Niger Delta ambush," 2013) resumed. Furthermore, the resources may be 
controlled by groups aiming to individually benefit from cooperation with foreign 
investor and letting little for public good (Yelpaala, 2010), thus creating new 
inequalities  (Rothgeb, 1991) and a ground for a social conflict. 
b) Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment inflows 
Before looking in the reasons for an entrepreneur to invest in a post-conflict 
country, we should look into how investors generally decide where to invest.  
The most common determinants of FDI inflows include such macroeconomic 
characteristics as size of the local market (Campos & Kinoshita, 2003),‘gross domestic 
product, GDP per capita or population’ (Gorbunova, Infante, & Smirnova, 2012, p. 
132), level of inflation and unemployment (Özkan-Günay, 2011) or economic 
performance mostly measured by economic growth (Ho & Rashid, 2011). Indicators of 
better economic performance usually relate to higher attractiveness for investment.  
Advantageous location of a country or its infrastructure may also attract investors, 
because such features may help to decrease costs of production for an investor 
(Castiglione, Gorbunova, Infante, & Smirnova, 2012). However, while for some 
countries such indicators as high inflation may determine reluctance of investors to 
enter their economy, the same indicator may not be decisive for such developed 
countries as EU members (Özkan-Günay, 2011).  
The differences of FDI inflows into the countries with same levels of economic 
development may be explained through such additional characteristics influencing 
effectiveness of production as cost and intensity of energy, level of innovations and 
technology, human capital (Özkan-Günay, 2011; Thangavelu, Yong, & Chongvilaivan, 
2009) or cost of labor (Gorbunova et al., 2012). Economic policies on taxation or trade 
openness are also among the determinants of inward FDI (Derado, 2013; Sharma & 
Bandara, 2010) as they might effect costs of production and of trade.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
phenomenon was the Netherlands when its exchange rate rose due to high gas exports what led to decrease of Dutch 
exports (Algieri, 2011) 
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Another determinant of FDI is found to be ‘absorptive capacity’ of the recipient 
economy, what relates to the ‘human capital resource, absorptive capacity of domestic 
firm, financial systems, physical infrastructure, technological and institutional 
development’ (Nguyen, Duysters, Patterson, & Sander, 2009). Among domestic 
institutions investment legislation, regulations on employment or business registration 
(Gorbunova et al., 2012) are found to influence investors’ preferences. 
Political regime as well may impact FDI inflows, however the dimension of such 
impact is not clear: while some argue that democracy is positively related to FDI 
(Jensen, 2003) others show just the opposite relation when the rule of law is controlled 
for (Li & Resnick, 2003). Still alternative explanations argue that in countries exporting 
natural resources democracy negatively increases FDI, while in countries with low 
resource exports democracy tends to foster FDI (Asiedu & Lien, 2011). 
c. Determinants of FDI inflows to Post-Conflict Countries 
Entrance in a post-conflict economy may bring higher profits than entrance in a 
developed country, as an investor may be the first-comer to the post-conflict market 
(Williams, 2009) and thus such investor would enjoy monopoly-like position in the 
domestic market. Cheap prices on labor and commodities add to the attractiveness of 
such economy. However, post-conflict countries also pose to investors multiple risks 
including risk of renewing violence, political instability, lack of infrastructure, 
corruption and regulation problems (Bray, 2009, p. 5). 
Even in comparison to other developing countries post-conflict countries have 
different patterns determining FDI inflow. For example, the level of political risk, the 
market size and effectiveness of institutions are more important for investors in post-
conflict countries than in developing countries in general (The World Bank, 2011a) as 
political  instability in such countries creates higher risks comparatively to regular 
developing countries, and thus prospects of profits dependent on market size of such 
risky countries should be higher than in other settings.  
Political stability also links domestic institutions, policies or laws to the FDI 
inflows as such domestic factors may prevent conflicts and thus make a country more 
attractive to FDI (Appel & Loyle, 2012). Among other risk indicators investors might 
look into the presence of foreign aid in the countries (Garriga & Phillips, 2013), 
countries’ membership in PTAs (preferential trade agreements) (Büthe & Milner, 2008) 
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or into such domestic institutions as post-conflict justice institutions as their reputation 
and cost makes state’s signals reliable (Appel & Loyle, 2012). 
In contrast, macro-economic characteristics and presence of qualified labor was of 
lesser concern for investors in conflict-affected countries (The World Bank, 2011a). 
However, the main concern for such investors is the possibility of ‘governmental 
intervention’ (The World Bank, 2011a). 
Moreover, according to the World Bank about 70% of FDI coming to conflict-
affected countries was concentrated in the resource rich countries (The World Bank, 
2011a), what shows that natural resources act as an important determinant of FDI in 
such regions. However, resource-based FDI may act differently from FDI in other 
sectors in a post-conflict country    An example from post-conflict Iraq shows that while 
‘lack of security, instability and corruption’ tend to impede entrance of FDI in a post-
conflict country, resource investors such as oil companies may not see security as ‘the 
major factor’ and do not necessarily see violence as an obstacle for their operations 
(Hanna et al., 2014). 
An additional determinant of FDI may be privatization policies, as some post-
conflict countries such as Croatia or Mozambique initiate privatization programs to 
become more attractive to foreign investors (The World Bank, 2011a). However, the net 
effect of such policies is not clear.  
d) Effects of Foreign Direct Investment 
FDI has resources larger than local firms and can bring technological and 
international marketing know-how (Bray, 2010, p. 3). They also can contribute to local 
infrastructure such as transport or communication due to their work or due to their need 
for such facilities or by agreement with state (Bray, 2010, p. 3). 
One of the main arguments for FDI on the recipient country relates to positive 
effect of FDI on the economic growth (Campos & Kinoshita, 2002). However, the 
effect is more significant for countries with ‘well-developed financial markets’ (Alfaro, 
Chanda, Kalemli-Özcan, & Sayek, 2004; Azman-Saini, Law, & Ahmad, 2010), while it 
becomes even negative in post-communist settings (Curwin & Mahutga, 2014).  
Such difference in effects of FDI on growth may also depend on the 
characteristics of FDI, of the recipient state and its policies (Trakman, 2009, p. 5). 
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Sector-based explanations are widely useful in this regard. For example, while primary 
sector FDI have negative effect on growth, FDI in manufacturing positively effects 
economic growth while service sector FDI has ambiguous effects (Alfaro, 2003). 
Another welfare measure – food security is also found to be negatively affected by FDI 
in resource sector, while FDI in manufacturing has positive effect on it (Mihalache-
O’keef & Li, 2011). Moreover, primary FDI may also be responsible for crowding out 
investment inflows into other sectors (Poelhekke & Van der Ploeg, 2010).  
Effects of FDI on domestic private investment are also ambiguous. Some find that 
FDI can ‘crowd in’ private investment (Rath & Bal, 2014), in contrast, other findings 
show that FDI may actually crowd out domestic FDI in the short run, while increasing 
efficiency of domestic firms in the long run through spillovers (Fedderke & Romm, 
2006, p. 758).    
FDI induced technology spillovers can lead to increased productivity of the local 
firms (Blomstrom & Sjoholm, 1998), substituting for the similar effect of investment in 
the Research and Development (R&D) (Chuang & Lin, 1999, p. 133).  Such effect may 
be of particular importance for post-conflict countries as they usually lack the resources 
to invest in R&D; however, transfer of technologies to the domestic sector in some 
cases may be restricted by their ‘absorptive capacity’ (Barrios, Dimelis, Louri, & Strobl, 
2002; Chudnovsky, López, & Rossi, 2008). Moreover, the scope and direction of the 
spillovers may also vary between industries (Suyanto, Bloch, & Salim, 2012). 
Such spillovers are believed to occur through linkages established between the 
foreign investor and private sector. However, while manufacturing FDI have a higher 
potential for linkages (UNCTAD, 2001), primary FDI investments may not bring 
linkages with local economy to induce technology transfers (UNCTAD, 2001; Yelpaala, 
2010, p. 43). 
Economic effects and spillovers of FDI also depend on the business model of a 
foreign enterprise. Investors interested in reaching local markets and in avoiding 
transportation/tariff costs use horizontal model of FDI replicating own company in a 
host country (Campos & Kinoshita, 2003, p. 5), this type is also called ‘market-
seeking’. Such horizontal FDI are mostly used for investments in manufacturing sectors. 
This model is seen as the most beneficial for host-countries as such enterprises bring the 
whole production process in a country thus providing know-how to local workers while 
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at the same time they create linkages with local markets obtaining inputs from local 
firms (Afriyie, 2009, p. 77).  
In contrast investors willing to benefit from regional difference between 
countries’ endowments and policies establish branches of own enterprise in such a way 
that each branch represents only one stage in overall production cycle thus establishing 
vertical MNEs showing ‘resource seeking’ or ‘asset seeking’ behavior (Campos & 
Kinoshita, 2003, p. 5). Resource seeking investors may be interested in extraction of 
natural resources without further processing of the resources at the same country 
(Yelpaala, 2010). Asset seeking investors in turn would establish production lines in 
countries with cheap labor, conduct design and research in countries with larger capital 
endowments and better educated labor, while they would prefer tax havens for final 
stages of their operations to avoid taxes on commercial transactions without establishing 
production sites on the territory of the recipient country (Yelpaala, 2010). In most cases 
of vertical FDI minimum positive spillovers are provided to the host-country because 
value creation is dispersed between different countries and the host country can learn 
little from the production stage implemented on its territory (Afriyie, 2009, p. 78).  In 
fact, resource FDI, on the contrary, often inflict negative social and environmental 
effects on the local population as it happened in Ghana where gold mining activities led 
to local population’s loss of farmlands, water pollution and clashes between the local 
youth and company’s security personnel (Afriyie, 2009, p. 81). 
Political effects of FDI are also not clear. According to some authors FDI promote 
democracy only in the short run and this effects decreases with time (Li & Reuveny, 
2003). According to others while FDI from developed democratic countries tend to 
promote democracy especially if it is in the manufacturing sector, FDI into the mining 
sector made by developing countries is found to have the most negative effect on 
democracy (Sun, 2014).   
In addition environmental arguments state that FDI can increase or decrease 
environmental risks in a recipient country. The increase of risks can be linked to low 
regulation of pollution in developing countries and investors’ use of such regulatory 
flaws, while on the other hand tougher environmental regulations within MNCs and 
international norms for exports may improve standards of recipient country. FDI in 
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‘pollution intensive industries’ is found to increase overall level of carbon dioxide 
emissions (Blanco, Gonzalez, & Ruiz, 2013). 
e) Effects of FDI on Conflict and Post-Conflict Countries – Evidence from 
Literature 
A number of studies suggest that FDI is likely to help to consolidate peace. 
Some proponents of this approach argue that investment, as a factor of economic 
interdependence and globalization, brings economic development, promotes democracy 
and thus reduces conflict (Gissinger & Gleditsch, 1999, p. 329). Another explanation is 
based on the argument that increases in price of foreign capital are positively related to 
the probability of civil conflict (Chapman & Reinhardt, 2013). Thus, supporting this 
explanation this approach states that scarcity of capital may cause conflicts and claim 
that increase of foreign capital can actually decrease the probability of political unrest 
(Rothgeb, 1991, p. 18) 
In contrast other scholars argue that globalization measured as FDI inflows tend 
to increase inequalities within societies and thus trigger domestic conflicts (Gissinger & 
Gleditsch, 1999, pp. 335-336) . Such increase of social inequalities may happen if FDI 
is benefiting only a small portion of population – this effect is strongest in FDI in 
natural resource extraction (Mahler, 1981, p. 290). The economic value such FDI 
creates can easily be captured by the government with minimal spill-over to the region 
in which these investments are located. Similarly, such natural resources investment 
needs little support from the society of the region as human capital (e.g. engineers) and 
infrastructure (e.g. excavation machines) can easily be transferred in and out of the 
region. In addition, the workers in such industries are usually low-skilled – and their 
interaction with the local populace can be limited (e.g. miners are often live in factory 
barracks. For instance, in Niger a mining town Arlit was initially created just as a 
settlement for miners working in the uranium mines operated by AREVA Group 
("Niger: Residents of Uranium Mining Town Fear They Are Being Exposed to 
Radioactive Poisoning," 2005)). In contrast, investments in non-resource sectors, (e.g. 
manufacture, services, infrastructure) draw a lot of support from this immediate locality: 
such companies invest in the regions human resources; educate prospective workers in 
tasks, allowing workers to specialize. Moreover, they claim that state may absorb the 
economic benefit from growth induced by foreign capital to increase own coercive 
capacity (Jackson, Russett, Snidal, & Sylvan, 1978, p. 652) and support foreign capital 
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to guarantee such growth at the same time decreasing own legitimacy vis-a-vis 
population (Rothgeb, 1991, p. 13).  
Another risk is that FDI always creates winners and losers, hence  and conflicts of 
how such losers should be compensated (Bray, 2010, p. 3). New conflicts can emerge 
due to creation of new sharp inequalities between local elites supporting and supported 
by foreign investors and poor population dominated by foreign corporations (mainly in 
manufacturing sector) and decrease of legitimacy of political elites due to their 
dependence on FDI (Rothgeb, 1991). FDI can also lead to a political reaction from local 
business as new capital puts old entrepreneurs in a previously capital scarce society in a 
disadvantageous position – however, this is hardly a case of impoverished societies with 
very weak or almost absent local capital (Rothgeb, 1991, pp. 15-16). On the other hand 
improving conditions of local labor can lead to increase of their political demands and if 
such demands are not met a conflict may arise.   
Rothgeb (1991), testing which of these propositions holds, found only that FDI 
could increase political protests in wealthier countries, while it is mainly negatively 
related to political turmoil and not related to civil war (Rothgeb, 1991, p. 26). In 
contrast in a similar quantitative analysis Gissinger and Gleditsch (1999) found that FDI 
indeed led to higher inequality and higher political unrest though the relation was not 
statistically significant (Gissinger & Gleditsch, 1999, pp. 345-346). A support for the 
argument of destabilizing effect of foreign investment is shown in a case-study on post-
2003 Iraq stating that FDI ‘reinforced destabilizing dynamics’ by deepening inequality, 
decentralization and challenging ‘internal and external balances of power’ (Castiglione 
et al., 2012). 
Another approach states that private investment is likely to exacerbate conflict 
due to creation of additional sources for tax-extraction for both government and rebels 
(Berman, Felter, Kapstein, & Troland, 2012).  The authors constructed a information 
based formal model showing that government and the rebels contest tax revenues from 
firms and thus violence tends to increase in the short run, however, their empirical 
analysis shows that in the long run level of violence decreases (Berman et al., 2012, p. 
28). The study acknowledges possible opportunity costs and social costs that the rebels 
can face in response to their violence, and underlines that it is the government whose 
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greed is crucial for increase in violence to ensure control in the contested regions 
(Berman et al., 2012).  
Though findings of Berman and al. (2012) provide an alternative model for the 
effect of investment on intra-state conflicts, this model is not fully applicable for our 
paper as on the one hand effects and characteristics of FDI are different from those of 
the private investments in general. On the other hand effect of investments during post-
conflict period may be also different from that of during the conflict stage. First of all, 
some foreign investors may have opportunities to leave the country in case of increasing 
violence (though such opportunity depends on the type of investment, as capital 
intensive investments such as factories etc. may be more difficult or impossible to move 
out of the region) while the local entrepreneurs do not have such flexibility. Such exits 
from the local markets by FDI we can observe quite often, as it was in case of Shell 
which stopped oil investigation program in the East of Turkey for six years after an 
attack by PKK in 1992 ("Batman'da Petrol Sahasına Silahlı Saldırı: 3 Ölü," 2011).3 
Thus the greed mechanism may be less applicable for FDI where greedy actors may 
lose perspective of revenues due to investors exit after conflict recurrence.  
Furthermore, the governmental greed emphasized in the model may not be 
observable in post-conflict settings as some governments on the contrary provide 
exceptional tax exemptions and subsidies for investors in the conflict affected areas. 
Turkish policy regarding regional, large-scale or strategic investments (both foreign and 
domestic) in the conflict-affected Eastern regions, exemplify this approach. Since 2012 
such investors enjoy tax reductions larger than that in other regions, receive income tax 
withholding allowance and support for social security premium not available in other 
regions (Investment Support and Promotion Agency, n.d.). While we acknowledge that, 
especially in cases of FDI in primary resource, FDI-related revenues may be a source of 
greed of governments or rebels, the greed-based models may not be applicable to 
explain effects of foreign investments on the post-conflict settings.  
Arguing that the quantitative analysis accounting for macro-level differences may 
not explain the variations in possible effects of FDI on internal conflicts Campbell 
                                                          
3 Apart from the type of investment the size and the expected profits from the investment may also determine the 
willingness of an investor to exit the country. Big investors with high stakes in the region may prefer not to exit the 
area or not to stop the operations completely, but just to decrease the volumes of production. For example, in Nigeria 
oil production was reduced  by 25-40 % due to rebel attacks on oil installations ("Nigeria's Oil Production Down 40% 
Because of Militant Attacks," 2008; "Nigeria Oil Unrest 'Kills 1,000'," 2009). Thus, we acknowledge, that in cases of 
such investments the possibility of greed-based explanations should also be accounted for.  
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conducted a micro-level analysis of Columbia and presented a model for FDI effects 
(Campbell & Carment, N.D.). She argues that a foreign company can influence peace 
both positively and negatively, depending on the type of conflict (type, stage, and 
location) and ability of the company to identify and address the type and issues of the 
conflict correctly, to construct relations according to the type of the enterprise and 
actors from different parts of society (Campbell & Carment, N.D., p. 37).  
Though this study provides a detailed guide for investors on how to operate in a 
post-conflict environment, the study does not show under what conditions an investor is 
willing and ready to spend effort to establish such relations. Moreover, such 
recommendations do not take into account the dynamism of the relations between the 
conflicting parties and thus the possibility of shifts of balance between them and shift of 
their preferences. In order to address these issues this paper will firstly present a model 
of interaction between investors, rebels and state will derive some hypotheses based on 
such model. The subsequent game theoretical analyses will formally explicate the causal 
relations these hypotheses present.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL MODEL OF INTERACTION BETWEEN INVESTOR, 
GOVERNMENT AND REBELS  
 
The theoretic model presented in this paper is based on a population-centric 
approach arguing that the relations between government and rebel group are dependent 
on the level of support provided to them by the local population
4
 (Siguera & Sekeris, 
2012).  
A theoretic interaction presented by De Lombaerde and Garay (2010) stipulates 
that a double-sided relation exists between FDI, economic growth and conflict (De 
Lombaerde & Garay, 2010). According to the authors on the one hand conflict may 
increase the volume of FDI inflows and in a reverse way of FDI inflows may influence 
conflict, on the other hand FDI can contribute to economic growth while higher 
economic growth may attract more FDI, and at the same time such economic growth 
(that might be affected by FDI) is also related to conflict as lows growth tends to 
increase the likelihood of conflict and vice versa, while conflicts are likely to decrease 
economic growth (and thus affect FDI) (De Lombaerde & Garay, 2010). The graphic 
presentation of such relation is given below:  
 
                                                          
4 Though not all types of rebels might be dependent strongly on the support of local population, still in most cases 
rebel organizations may be influenced by intelligence information provided by local population to the government. 
We also acknowledge that the term ‘local population’ in real life may actually refer t ohighly heterogeneous society 
at least part of which in fact does not support either government or rebels. Thus a local society with broad part of 
such neutral population may not influence the relations between the rebels and the government as strongly as this 
model predicts.  
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Figure 1: Interaction between FDI, economic growth and conflict. Source: De 
Lombaerde and Garay 2010. 
 
The nature of interaction between FDI and growth, growth and conflict and the 
effect of conflict on FDI are widely studied as was shown in the literature review above. 
In contrast the direction of the effect of FDI on conflict remains unknown. Keeping in 
mind this complex interaction we will go one step further and analyze the unknown part 
of the model – the dimension of the impact of FDI on conflict. Adopting a population-
oriented approach we argue that FDI influences the relationship between government 
and rebels in several ways presented below. 
 
 
The goal of this model is to define what the nature of the government – rebel 
interaction would be: attack or compliance with the initial settlement. The interaction 
depicted on the image can be explained as follows.  
First, FDI inflows provide additional revenues for government through taxes, 
royalties and shares of profit (McMillan & Waxman, 2007, p. 10).
5
 Moreover, as before 
                                                          
5 Share of profits is a common practice in FDI focusing on natural resource extraction though the rates of such 
schemes differ across countries and time (McMillan & Waxman, 2007). Sometimes they are determined by the 
Local 
Population 
GOVERNMENT REBELS 
FDI 
Figure 2: Population-centric view of Government-Rebels-FDI interaction 
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entering a country investors evaluate the market risks analyzing previous developments 
there, presense of investor in a country disincentivize government from initiating new 
violent conflict, as such conflict may lead to capital flight from the country, to the loss 
of  expected of FDI-related revenues and damage of the country image as an investment 
destination. At the same time, governmental policies, such as lowering or increasing 
bareers for foreign investors’ entry, or special policies regarding allocation of the 
permissions for FDI, influence the  amount of investors entering the country and their 
strategies of entrance and operations. Some of such pro-investment policies, hovewer, 
may also inflict costs on government. Thus once such policies are implemented the 
government may have incentives to keep peace and secure presence of FDI in the 
region.  
Based on this interaction we make following proposition: 
I. FDI is likely to create incentives for government to keep peace due to 
prospect of receiving FDI-related revenues which can whither away in case 
of conflict recurrence.  
On the other hand, in some cases foreign investors can also directly cooperate with 
rebels, seeking rebel support in case of fights between several militias or in order to 
prevent attacks from the local armed groups (though such activities are deemed as 
illegal and are scandalized if disclosed). An example for such behavior of foreign 
investors is a case of South African mining company Anglogold Ashanti who was 
involved in a scandal of making payment to FDI rebels of Democratic Republic of 
Congo (Games, 2011). At the same time, rebels can be involved in the violence against 
a foreign investment in order to take over the resources or take a share of the profıts of 
the company as it is sometimes the case in Nigerian oil rich Niger Delta. However, we 
do not account for this relation in our model as in the case of illegal interaction between 
an investor and the rebels, the possible damage for the investor’s international image 
and possible sanctions on such multi-national enterprise would prevent endurance of 
such relation. At the same time the direct attacks on firms of foreign investors are likely 
to stop production or motivate investors to withdraw from the country and thus reduce 
possible spoils. An argument can be made that, even if a foreign mining company 
leaves the country, the rebels will have access to the natural resources; however, in this 
                                                                                                                                                                          
governmental share in a joint-stock company founded between investor and government. Royalties in turn refer to 
investors’ payments to the country for the right to use particular resources or lands of the country.  
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case models explaining impact of natural resources on conflict may be more applicable 
than the models explaining impact of FDI.  
An alternative relation bewteen FDI and conflict (between government and rebels) 
relates to the interaction between the three mentioned actors and the local population.  
Government – Population Interaction 
The interaction between the government and population is based on the notion of 
legitimacy. A legitimacy can be defined as a consent of people to the right of a state to 
rule over them (Mcloughin, 2014) and is dependent on the ‘output side’ of the state – on 
the quality of public policies and administration (Rothstein, 2007, p. 39), input side – 
the mechanisms of policy formation, charismatic characteristics of leaders and 
international recognition (Kurtenbach, 2009). For the purpose of this paper we will 
focus, however, only on the output dimension of legitimacy assuming other dimensions 
as remaining constant. In other words, we will focus on the mechanism where the state 
provides services (i.e. security, health, infrastructure etc.) for the population; the 
population, in turn, accepts legitimacy of the rule of the state. Moreover, as in post-
conflict settings legitimacy may be fragmented and contested by different actors having 
different forms of legitimacy (Kurtenbach, 2009, p. 8), decrease of legitimacy of the 
state would mean increase of legitimacy of alternative actors. 
FDI can affect the population-government relations in several ways. While social 
benefits of private enterprises can increase population’s support for peace and existing 
regime (Bray, 2009, p. 2), dependence of government on foreign investment and 
government’s abuse of related economic benefits on the contrary can reduce 
government’s legitimacy (Rothgeb, 1991, p. 3). Indeed perception of unjust 
redistribution of economic benefits from investments in a particular area is often one of 
the causes of intra-state conflicts as can be exemplified by Tuareg rebellion in Niger in 
2007-2009 when Tuareg demanded from government more equitable redistribution of 
profits from the uranium mining activities carried out in the region by foreign 
multinational companies ("NIGER: New Tuareg Rebel Group Speaks Out," 2007).  In 
other words, an equitable redistribution and/or investment of FDI benefits in the region 
through developmental or other programs tend to increase the legitimacy of the 
government, and allow the government to garner broader support from the local 
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population
6
. Conversely, appropriation of all of profits by the central government with 
little redistribution (or government-led developmental policies) to the affected area is 
likely to decrease government’s legitimacy in that area. Iraqi case provides an example 
for such FDI relationship where failure of the government to reduce unemployment 
despite large revenues from oil extraction activities conducted by foreign investors led 
to expansion of informal economy and ‘undermined state legitimacy’ (Costantini, 2013, 
p. 272).   
The positive impact of government-led developmental programs on attitudes of 
the affected population towards the government is supported by an experimental study 
in Afghanistan conducted by Beath et al (2011). The authors found that program 
affected villagers’ attitudes towards the government indeed improved; however, the 
authors did not found relation between such programs and security conditions at those 
areas (Beath, Christia, & Enikolopov, 2011, p. 4). Based on these findings it is possible 
to propose that if the government will use some or all profits from FDI for a 
developmental program of the affected region, the legitimacy of the government in 
those regions will increase.  
Population’s support for existing order and peace, however, may also decrease if 
local enterprises are harmed by the FDI as has been the concern in Iraq and Afghanistan 
(Bray, 2009, p. 15). In other cases, though, local businesses can benefit from the trade 
linkages with the foreign investor. At the same time too much involvement in politics 
by the investors may also undermine government’ legitimacy (Bray, 2010, p. 21) and 
create perception of a ‘state capture’7.  
Rebels – Population interaction: 
When  a government fails to provide order and social services for its citizens, a 
rebel group acting on behalf of these citizens may evolve to be the legitimate 
representative of their interests. In such a way while a rebel group offers population 
                                                          
6
 This therizing is built on the assumption that the local population have the information about the size of the FDI 
related profits the government receives and about the way these profits are redistributed. However, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that in many post-conflict countries lack of transparency of the governments may indeed prevent local 
population from knowing details of such redistribution. Thus while in cases of large scale foreign investments such as 
natural-resources FDI, the local population can at least speculatively estimate the amout of profits the government 
receives and relate it to the scope of services provided by the government, in other cases evaluation of the relation 
between FDI-related revenues and governmental redistribution may be much more difficult. For the current model we 
assume that the local population have such knowledge; hovewer, we acknowledge that the lack of population’s access 
to such information can disturb the proposed interactions. 
7 ‘State capture’ is understood as a situation when a particular group ceases control over state institutions and their 
decisions (Pesic, 2007, p. 1) 
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protection of their unmet needs, the population in return accepts legitimacy of the rebel 
organization and provides some level of support to them.  
In regards of FDI as it was stated above the state’s legitimacy and local support 
may depend on the ability and willingness of state to equitable redistribute the benefits 
from FDI to the local population. Thus if and when a state fails to do so its legitimacy 
decreases, and if no alternative actor except of rebels is present, the population is likely 
to provide support for the rebels. In contrast if a state successfully redistributes the 
benefits and stimulates development of the region, legitimacy of the state is likely to 
strengthen and support of the state by population is likely to increase. Thus depending 
on the type of governmental redistributive policies of FDI induced profits, the level of 
legitimacy of both state and rebels is likely to change in opposite directions.  
Based on this relation between the level of legitimacy of (and thus support of local 
population towards) the government and the redistributive policy of the government, 
one can theorize that the government has incentive to use FDI profits in order to 
increase own legitimacy (i.e. decrease local support for the rebels). Though no empirical 
work up to date has show this exact relation with regards to governmental revenues 
from FDI, the fact of use of developmental programs and social services as a tool to 
fight rebels is supported by both academic and anecdotal evidence.  
Provision of social services as a tool to increase population’s support to 
incumbent and to undermine local support to the rebels is used for more than half a 
century. Such policy known as winning ‘hearts and minds’ through providing services 
for the populations in the contested areas was made popular and implemented by  the 
British High Commissioner in Malaya General Sir Gerald Templer, who was a part of 
British colonial administration fighting MCP insurgency in Malaya in 1950s (Stubbs, 
2008). Thus our second assumption is regarding the legitimacy inducing potential of 
FDI:  
II. The government has an incentive to redistribute FDI-related revenues in the 
contested region via public investment, social services or developmental 
programs in order to increase own legitimacy.   
Although use of such policy is often proposed for post-conflict countries in order 
to promote state-building there, the effect of such programs on the post conflict peace 
may actually be negative. Change of the legitimacy of one of the parties of the conflict 
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will change the balance of power between the parties of the conflict and, therefore, 
induce the reliable commitment problem.  Knowing that FDI-related revenue 
redistribution policy will increase governmental legitimacy and reduce local 
population’s support to the rebels, the rebels can expect that government may try to 
eliminate them after such goal is achieved. Therefore, unless the government may 
reliably commit to the initial settlement, the rebels, knowing that their bargaining power 
(and, hence, fighting capacity as it is also dependant on the local population’s support) 
will decrease in the future, have incentive to break the truce before such program is 
implemented.  
Possibility of such adverse effect of redistributive/developmental programs on 
peace is supported by the existing literature. A recent empirical study of a state-led 
development program  in Philippines found that such programs correlate positively with 
the number of casualties in the affected regions (and with increase of violence during 
civil conflict ‘at least in the short term’) (Crost, Felter, & Johnston, 2014). The authors 
explained this finding as linked either to additional sources for greed of rebels or a shift 
of legitimacy of government that caused commitment problems (Crost et al., 2014, p. 
20). Moreover, they found that the violence in Philippines was highest during the 
preparation stage of the programs (Crost et al., 2014, p. 21) what is consistent with the 
commitment problem approach as prevention of the programs is likely to prevent 
change of the balance of power or at least undermine legitimacy of the government 
acting at the same time as a security providing entity. 
Although an earlier study of US-funded developmental program CERP in IRAQ 
showed that the program tended to reduce violence, the authors acknowledged that such 
effect was conditional on high strength of troops, small size of projects and high 
expertise of the people implementing the projects (Berman, Shapiro, & Felter, 2011). At 
the same time authors stated that non CERP funds accounting for 90% of overall 
reconstruction spending had no ‘violence reducing effects’ (Berman et al., 2011, p. 
810). Indeed the difference in findings may be explained to occur due to difference of 
the initiators and funders of the programs: government of Philippines in case of 
Philippines conflict, and US government in case of Iraqi conflict.   
Thus our third proposition regarding the effect of FDI on commitments of rebels 
is as follows: 
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III. FDI is likely to create the reliable commitment problem for rebels if 
government redistributes FDI-related revenues in the regions while it is not 
able to commit trustfully to the settlement with the rebels (Unless such 
redistribution of FDI-revenues is the main condition of the settlement).  
Interaction between FDI and population:  
Foreign owned companies may create multiple positive economic externalities for 
the local population ranging from  employment to education programs, infrastructure 
building to services, provision of new goods with lower costs, and provision of linkages 
for local enterprises (Games, 2011). Moreover, as a part of ther corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) programs foreign companies may directly participate in charity 
activities or fundraising for the development of societal capacity. Provision of 
emergency aid by French investor AREVA in Nigerien uranium mine is an example of 
such programs (AREVA, 2011). On the other hand FDI can also produce such negative 
externalities harming local population as environmental degradation, work low labor 
standards, creation of new elites and new inequalities, expropriation of communal lands 
(as it is the case in many agrigultural investment projects), their security forces may use 
‘illegal and violent’ methods to protect the investor’s company  or may increase 
polarization of the society through biased employment strategies etc. (Campbell & 
Carment, N.D.).   
Thus the local population is often directly positively or negatively influenced by 
foreign business working in a foreign owned company, using goods produced by such 
company or suffering environmental degradation inflicted by such company. Therefore, 
in case if such economic externalities are negative population may initiate protests 
against or attacks on the foreign company. If the government remains unwilling to solve 
the population grievances, the rebels are likely to initiate attacks against the investor 
inflicting negative externalities and against government ignoring such negative effect of 
FDI at least by inaction.  
Additional dimension of the relation of population towards investor may also 
derive from the redistribution of benefits from FDI received by the state. The investor 
instead of the state can become a ‘target of frustration’ of people suffering the lack of 
governmental services which were expected to improve with inflow of FDI (Campbell 
& Carment, N.D., p. 49). This phenomenon can also relate to the relative deprivation 
26 
 
theory predicting emergence of a conflict when new expectations are not met by new 
realities (Pruitt & Kim, 2004). Thus, whatever is nature of the frustration of population 
with the investor, the frustrated part of the local population is going to be represented by 
the mobilized arm of the population – the rebels.  
However, if externalities of investment are positive such as increase of 
employment, possibility to use new infrastructure or vital services, the population is 
likely not decrease their support for the rebels in case of their attack on investor or 
government. Such effect can be explained through opportunity cost argument originally 
posing that higher employment is likely to reduce rebel violence due to higher 
opportunity costs for participation in rebel activities (Hanson et al., 2011).  Thus 
positive economic externalities of FDI for the local population are likely to 
disincentivize rebels from attacking the government. At the same time such externality 
will not necessarily translate into direct increase of support to the government either, 
and thus economic externalities of FDI will not change the balance of power and create 
a threat for rebels. Thus our last proposition is as follows: 
IV. Positive economic externalities of FDI are likely to create opportunity cost 
for local population and, thus, the population’s support to rebels may 
decrease in case if they breach the settlement. However, if the government is 
the party defying the truce, than the popular support for rebels will not be 
affected by such opportunity cost. In case of negative economic externalities 
the direction of the change of population’s support for the rebels will be 
opposite.  
To sum up the FDI may produce new incentives for government and rebels to 
keep peace. At the same time as redistribution of FDI is linked to the State’s legitimacy 
and thus inversely linked to the rebels’ legitimacy it also acts as a legitimacy inducing 
mechanism. Moreover, due to shift in the level of population support of the government 
or rebels by the local population, during the initial step of peacebuilding the conflict 
parties are likely to change their commitments made before.  
Based on this theoretic structure of the relationship between the government, 
rebels and Investors we construct a formal model accounting for the conditions 
necessary to maximize the benefits of such interaction for all three parties. 
27 
 
 
  
28 
 
CHAPTER 4. 
THE GAME: STRATEGIC INTERACTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT, THE 
REBELS AND INVESTOR 
 
4.1. Methodology 
In order to understand the strategic interaction between the government, the rebels and 
investor and the reasons for their choices this paper will construct a game based on the 
reliable commitment problem. As it was proposed in the previous chapter the 
interactions between the three actors have a potential of disturbing the initial balance 
between the government and the rebels and motivate at least one of them to defy on 
initial settlement. The rationale for the commitment problems as an explanation for 
intra-state conflict is based on the idea that although conflicting parties may possess 
perfect information about capabilities of each others, they still may have incentives to 
fight or ‘renegotiate’ an agreement (Powell, 2002, p. 24).  
Using the rationale of dynamic commitment problem, Fearon (2004) proposed that 
changing strength of government makes its commitments less trustful and thus prevents 
settlement of a civil conflict (Fearon, 2004). However, the commitment problem is not 
limited to government only. A study of international intervention and coercion proposed 
that coercive demands by a great power may shift balance of power in favor of rebels 
and thus to create a commitment problem where the rebels can not commit trustfully, 
and, therefore, governments in such situations are likely to risk international 
intervention and resort to violent conflict (Haggerty, 2013). The applicability of such 
logic to the post-conflict settings is also justifiable, as according to Flores and 
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Nooruddin (2011) commitment or inability to commit is essential for post-conflict 
peacebuilding as well, because the ex-combatants have no authority ensuring their 
compliance with the initial agreement (Flores & Nooruddin, 2011).   
Therefore, we apply the logic of dynamic commitment problem to the post-conflict 
settings where parties have information about each other and their balance of power is 
likely to be shifted in the short run only by entrance of FDI into the country.  
4.2. Introduction of the Game: Basic Assumptions 
This paper attempts to model government – rebel interaction after formal or 
informal settlement achieved through negotiations, ceasefire, start of peace process or 
other peaceful means achieved after a period of mutual violence. The conflict settlement 
is possible if as a result of the settlement the sides of the conflict receive resources at 
least equal to their payoffs for the war continuation. We assume that by the time of 
settlement parties (state and insurgency/rebels) had perfect information acquired 
through multiple rounds of fights or through other mechanisms. This paper also assumes 
that the settlement was reached according to the rational preferences with assumption 
that if states possess perfect information about each other’s capacity, they can find an 
equilibrium, where both states would prefer not to fight, as satisfying demands of an 
opponent would for both of them provide an outcome better than possible outcome in 
case of war (Powell, 2002, p. 24).  
Thus the first assumption of this model is that parties formally or informally 
recognize each other, and this mutual recognition was one of the factors that allowed 
parties to end violence by peaceful means. Due to this reason conflicts, which are ended 
by complete military victory of either government or insurgency, are not accounted by 
this model, as they might not provide a context of mutual recognition.  
The second assumption is that parties have symmetric information of each other’s 
capabilities acquired through previous fights. Therefore, possible recurrence of war is 
more likely to occur due to incentives to change the agreed-upon outcomes. Hence this 
paper will use the dynamic commitment problem approach often used to identify such 
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incentives of one or both parties to defy peace due to changes in the power balance or in 
the cost of war (Powell, 2002, p. 24).    
Civil war is sometimes seen as a crisis of legitimacy (though this approach is 
contested by the idea that absence of any alternative power and thus absence of conflict 
may not mean acceptance of the legitimacy of prevailing incumbent) (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 
92). Moreover, the ultimate goal of insurgency can be seen as acquiring such level of 
support of the population so that government will not be able to sustain own rule any 
longer (Siqueira and Sekeris 2012).  Therefore, legitimacy and rivalry for local support 
or loyalty are accounted for in this model of domestic conflict. Local loyalty is 
particularly important for domestic conflicts, as sometimes such loyalty is a determining 
factor for the success of rebels using non-conventional (paramilitary) warfare tactics 
(Kalyvas, 2006). Consequently changes in legitimacy (in our case FDI induced changes 
in legitimacy) in the context of post-conflict country may cause perception of changing 
balance of power and, thus, may foster defection of the existing agreement in order to 
prevent future losses due to decreasing bargaining power.  
Initial Balance between Parties 
The game consists of two actors: government (G) and rebels (R). After the two 
reach a peace agreement, accounting for the relative power between the parties, an 
investor enters the disputed territory. We assume that the full control over the fiscal 
operations such as taxation on this territory remains in the hands of the government. 
Moreover, regulations regarding investors and the right to allow investment into the 
area are also in the government’s control. This clause is particularly important as in 
cases where rebels/de-facto autonomous government of the disputed territory controls 
the policy on investments (Iraqi Kurdistan is an example for this case (Hanna et al., 
2014)) presence of investment tends to have rather opposite effects on the parties and 
their relative balance of power. 
The actors move sequentially: firstly government decides a policy regarding the 
revenues accrued from investor and announces or initiates related programs (if any). 
Then rebels decide to comply with or defy on the initial peace agreement considering 
the probable outcomes of the policies regarding investors.  
Ideally rebels can choose a middle ground between peace and renewal of war by 
maintaining low scale conflict (Siguera & Sekeris, 2012). In such a way the rebels 
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signal to the population that they defend interests of the population and thus can 
increase support of the population in order to move to more decisive actions/war in the 
next round.   For the purpose of this analysis we will assume that such low scale 
violence may be still seen as a part of negative peace unless any party of the conflict 
publicly announces an end of a peace process or the conflict becomes overly violent.  
Such assumption is justifiable as the governments, knowing that recurrence of domestic 
conflicts may decrease the amount of incoming investments governments have 
incentives to keep peace and even in case of spot-fighting to assure investors that peace 
is not endangered (For example, in Democratic Republic of Congo renewal of Katanga 
militia attacks is said by government not to represent a new wave of war and not to 
endanger investors in the mining sector of the affected area (Kavanagh, 2013)).  
Finally, the government decides whether to comply with or defy on the initial 
agreement considering the potential reaction of rebels on government policies regarding 
investment. While making their decisions government and rebels compare different 
payoffs for different sets of strategies.   
We assume that the initial balance between the government and the rebels is 
perfectly proportional to their bargaining powers (military capacities etc.) and thus to 
outcomes that could be achieved in case of violent conflict. The balance is defined by 
the portion of power or resources or control over the contested territory or population 
(all of these are referred as ‘Resources’ hereafter) the government has transferred to the 
rebels in order to satisfy their demands. Thus if we assume that the total of the contested 
sources is 1, the balance between the parties provides division of such resources as (1-x) 
kept by the government, and (x) obtained by the rebels. In case of conflict the share of 
resources the government can acquire is (1-x)-Cg, where Cg is the cost of conflict for 
the government. Similarly, the share of resources that can be obtained by the rebels in 
case of conflict renewal is x-Cr, where Cr is the cost of conflict for the rebels. Moreover, 
we assume that such equilibrium is stable and there is no initial expectation of any shift 
in the balance of powers. Thus both parties have no incentives to renew conflict as in 
case of war their shares of resources/power will decrease in absolute value while 
comparatively their shares will remain the same.  
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Entrance of Investor after successful Settlement.  
A peace dividend in terms of investment inflow is expected after several years after the 
conflict settlement. Thus it is expected that some period of relative peace has passed 
before investors decide to enter the disputed territory.  
 If government attracts and accepts an investor into the disputed area, the 
investor is likely to bring new tax revenue or other revenues (denoted hereafter as ‘F’) 
from the foreign direct investment (i.e. royalties, rents on licenses, profits from revenue-
sharing agreements) and some positive or negative economic externalities (referred as 
‘Ex’ hereafter) for the country (higher employment of local population, technology and 
knowledge transfer, new services or goods available for the region, commercial linkage 
between groups etc vs. environmental harm etc.).  
Two-Actor Model: FDI without Economic Externalities for Population 
Government of a unitary state with no political power sharing with rebels may 
unilaterally decide what to do with the additional direct revenue from this Investor. 
Thus Government may redistribute or not redistribute the revenue to the disputed 
region. In the period 1 the government announces its budget for the year showing, 
which proportion of the expected revenue will be redistributed to the region (an 
alternative way to announce the policy regarding the distribution of revenues from FDI 
may be an announcement of a particular developmental program, public investments 
etc). 
If the government redistributes revenues coming from the new foreign investment 
in taxes or shared profits, the legitimacy of government in the disputed area will 
increase by ΔLg. If the government does not redistribute revenue, the local population 
will be frustrated and their grievances will increase. These grievances will translate into 
the higher support to rebels from the population and rise of rebels legitimacy by ΔLr. In 
a region with perfectly polarized society (whose support is perfectly divided between 
the government and the rebels) the change in legitimacy of government inversely 
related to the change in legitimacy of rebels, thus |ΔLg|=|ΔLr|. For the purpose of this 
paper we assume that the contested population’s support is perfectly divided between 
the government and the rebels.  
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In contrast if government engages in redistributes revenues accrued from FDI and 
invests them in the regions’ development, the legitimacy of government is likely to rise 
by ΔLg. As a result of rise of government’s legitimacy its bargaining power will also 
rise. Thus rebels can expect that the government will not keep its commitment and will 
be willing to satisfy less of their demands (i.e. because the government will be willing 
to keep the share of resources equal to (1-x)+Lg thus decreasing the share of resources 
granted to rebels.  As a result the rebels will be more likely to defy on the agreement 
before the end of the period and de facto redistribution of resources. 
If government does not redistribute revenue coming from the investment (through 
taxation of the investor or revenue sharing schemes often used for investments in 
natural resources e.g. Canadian gold mining investor CenterraGold in Kyrgyzstan 
sharing stocks and revenues from extracted gold (Centerra Gold, 2015)), then the 
population of the territory where the investor is located is likely to be dissatisfied with 
government due its appropriation of revenues.  Thus this population’s support for the 
government is likely to decrease, as people will perceive such allocation of revenue as 
unjust, while the population’s support for the rebels will increase by ΔLr. In this case 
rebels will have no incentive to defy from the initial agreement in the beginning of the 
period as their bargaining power at the end of this period will increase by ΔLr. 
Due to the expected increase in the rebels’ bargaining power at the end of the 
period, the rebels’ initial commitment will become less reliable because with greater 
legitimacy the rebels may declare higher demands (equal to x+ΔLr), and if such 
demands are not met, the rebels are likely to turn to violent conflict in the next periods 
and acquire a share of resources higher than that initially agreed on. In case of such 
conflict again the rebels, enjoying population support higher than before, are likely to 
gain a share of resources higher than that allocated by the initial settlement (the newly 
demanded share will be (x+ΔLr). Niger is an example for such situation where an 
identity-based conflict between ethnic Tuareg minority and the state settled in 1995 was 
renewed in 2007 that time with increased number of demands including the call for 
higher redistribution of revenues from uranium mining located in the Tuareg populated 
region (Emerson, 2011). Therefore, unless the rebels can ensure their commitments or 
unless the government is able to increase own bargaining power proportionately, the 
government is going to be disadvantaged in the long run as its bargaining power will 
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decrease by ΔLg. Therefore, the government may prefer to defy on the initial agreement 
and attack rebels to prevent loss of own legitimacy and of control over the territory. 
Besides considering changes in legitimacy and financial benefits from the 
investor, the government also should take into consideration that in case of renewal of 
war, investor would be likely to leave the economy or at least stop its operations till the 
peace is established. Thus in case of war the government will lose its prospect of 
gaining the revenues (F) from FDI. Furthermore, if the government itself reneges on the 
agreement, such action will decrease the level of trust that other potential investors have 
towards this economy by (t), because they perceive the government usually is a 
guarantor of security of investors while renewal of war puts their investments in danger. 
As investors come into countries trusting commitment of the government to peace, 
defection on such commitment will make such guarantees of such government less 
reliable, while decrease of investors’ trust in the long run will mean less FDI inflows 
and thus less prospects for economic recovery.   
In addition both the government and the rebels are going to incur costs of conflict 
in case if peace is broken (Cg and Cr respectively). 
Strategies and Payoffs for the case of investment with no indirect benefits: 
The Government starts the game by deciding whether to redistribute FDI revenues 
or not, and then takes the turn back after receiving a reaction from rebels and if rebels 
keep up to peace the government decides whether to comply to initial settlement or to 
defy and restart the conflict. Thus government can use the following strategies: 
[redistribute, comply], [redistribute, defy], [not redistribute, comply], and [not 
redistribute – defy] (referred in the figures 1-3 as [R, C] [R, D] [NR,C] [NR,D]). 
 Rebels act only once in reaction to government’s policy regarding the FDI-
related revenues and the strategy set of rebels consists of two choices: [comply, defy]. 
The payoffs for all combinations of strategies used by the parties are given below: 
U(G;R): [(Redistribute-Comply), (Comply)] =((1-x+ΔLg)+F; x – ΔLr)  
U(G;R) : [(Redistribute-Defy), (Comply)] =((1-x)-I-Cg; x-Cr ) 
U(G; R): [(Redistribute), (Defy)] = (1-x-Cg; x-Cr) 
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U(G;R): [(Not redistribute, Comply), (Comply)] = ((1-x-ΔLg)+F; x+ΔLr-Cr)  
U(G;R): [(Not redistribute-Defy), (Comply)] = ((1-x)-t-Cg; x-Cr) 
U(G;R): [Not redistribute, Defy] = ((1-x) -Cg; x-Cr) 
 
 
 
 
If we solve this game by using backward induction, we should start with 
analyzing government’s decisions in two sub-games (sub-games where government 
redistributes revenue or not). In the sub-game where the government redistributes the 
FDI-related revenues, the government is likely to choose the ‘comply’ option as it 
would increase the payoff for the government to ((1-x+ ΔLg)+F), as reneging on the 
truce in such case would bring lower outcomes. If the government does not redistribute 
revenues, still government is likely to comply if revenues of FDI will compensate to the 
government the loss of legitimacy at least to such a point that will be more preferable 
than suffering of costs of conflict and damaged trust – (i.e. if (-ΔLg+F)>(-t-Cg)). In 
cases of natural resources FDI in particular anecdotal evidence would be that refenues 
from FDI indeed are prefered by governments despite the some loss of own legitimacy, 
thus we assume for the moment that the mentioned condition is satisfied.  
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Figure 3 Two-Actor Game without Economic Externalities 
36 
 
Considering that the government is going to keep compliance with the peace 
agreement, we should identify the strategies that rebels would prefer for each sub-game. 
If the government decides to redistribute revenue from the spoils of FDI, rebels are 
going to lose legitimacy if comply with the agreement, and less of their demands will be 
satisfied at the end of the period. Therefore, rebels would prefer to renege at the 
beginning to prevent loss of legitimacy. On the other hand if government does not 
redistribute revenues, legitimacy of rebels would increase and knowing that government 
is better off when complying rebels would prefer to comply as well and to ask for 
satisfaction of larger set of demands at the end of the period.  
As a result, the government will have to choose from two possible scenarios 
[redistribute (G) – defy (R)] and [not redistribute (G) – comply (R) – comply (G)]. Once 
again the decision of the government will depend on the importance the government 
assigns to the revenues from FDI (and thus in part on the nature of such FDI as 
governmental revenues from the natural resources FDI tend to be much higher than 
from other types of foreign investments).  
If the government values revenues higher than some loss of legitimacy in the 
region,  (i.e. if (-ΔLg+F)>(-Cg)) or if the net effect of revenues and loss of legitimacy is 
still more preferable for government than cost of war, than the initial peace will prevail. 
And the equilibrium in the game will be established at the scenario [(R)(D)]. An 
example of such peace may be derived from Nigeria where the government is ready to 
tolerate grievances of local population for the sake of revenues from oil mining 
companies providing the main sources of the governmental budget which in turn 
provides the basis for governmental functioning at all. However, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that such peace may not be deemed as stable as grievances of the 
population will continue to increase and the latent conflict will persist. (Latent conflict 
is a term used to describe a situation where people (or other actors) have differences 
making them uncomfortable but not to the extent of creating an open dispute unless an 
external ‘triggering event occurs’ (Brahm, 2003)). At the same time legitimacy of the 
rebels will be increasing, so that any exogenous factor may easily spark violent conflict 
that will result in worse outcome for the government.   
However, if the government values revenues from FDI as less important than the 
increase of own legitimacy in the disputed region, the government is likely to prefer 
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redistribution of revenues and face possibility of rebels defection. Thus under this 
condition the equilibrium would be (Redistribute, Defy) scenario. (The mechanism and 
examples of such scenario will be discussed in the next model as this scenario is likely 
to occur in case of non-resource FDI which is more likely to bring some economic 
externalities to the region). 
Examination of Redistribution as a Continuous Variable 
The model above treated redistribution as a discrete variable which may be either 
0 or 1 (0 for not redistribute strategy and 1 for redistribute strategy). However, 
apparently there is a possibility that redistribution of some portion of FDI related 
revenues would act consistent with ‘not redistribute’ strategy, while redistribution of 
higher proportions of FDI related revenues would result in outcomes similar to those of 
‘redistribute’ strategy. To test this possibility we can solve the following model inspired 
by the model used by Crost and Johnston (2010) in their discussion paper on 
developmental projects in conflict settlements (Crost & Johnston, 2010), though the 
rationale behind the models is different.  
First of all we should acknowledge that ΔLg is a function of redistribution of 
governmental revenues from FDI (ΔLg=f(r.F) – change in legitimacy as function of rate 
(r) that is going to be redistributed out of F). Thus different proportions of redistribution 
(r can range from 0 to 1) can cause different changes of legitimacy (ΔLg). The second 
difference we use of model with continuous redistribution is that we assume that ΔLg= -
ΔLr (in contrast in the model above we used absolute values of such changes). All other 
variables remain as defined above and the model is solved by backward induction. 
Utility functions of peace and conflict for the government are as follows: 
Ug(peace)= (1-x)+ ΔLg+F (1) 
(ΔLg can be either positive or negative).  
Ug(conflict)= (1-x)-Cg (2)  
Knowing that the government is the last moving actor in the game we can 
immediately find a change of legitimacy (based on particular rate of redistribution) that 
would ensure peace. As the peace is only possible when government values utility of 
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peace higher or at least equal to than its utility of conflict (i.e. U(peace) ≥ U (conflict)), 
we can find optimal level of change in legitimacy as follows: 
(1-x)+ ΔLg+F≥(1-x)-Cg, (3) 
thus we find the peace inducing ΔLg  to be as follows: 
ΔLg
*≥-F-Cg. (10) 
This means that the government will prefer peace in any situation, when the 
change in its legitimacy will incur fewer losses than the loss expected from cost of 
conflict and withering of FDI revenues. This means that the government can tolerate 
some amount of negative change of legitimacy and still keep peace (as predicted by the 
model above). Such condition can be explained as follows: if the change of legitimacy 
induces suffering of -1 of less (0, +1…) while potential loss of revenue and cost of 
conflict would induce suffering of -1 or more (-2, -3,…), the government will keep 
peace. As a result a peace inducing redistribution should support any legitimacy change 
in range [–F-Cg; +∞) 
To find the range of acceptable legitimacy change for rebels we define their utility 
functions as follows: 
Ur(peace)=x+ ΔLr (11) 
Ur(conflict)=x-Cr (12) 
Thus the acceptable change of legitimacy for rebels is: 
ΔLr≥-Cr, meaning that the rebels can tolerate loss of legitimacy until it creates more 
harm than the losses in case of conflict. Thus the change in rebels legitimacy allowing 
for peace is as follows-ΔLg≥-Cr or:  
 ΔLg≤Cr.  (13) 
This means that the government can redistribute such a low portion of revenues so 
that consequent change in governmental legitimacy does not inflict losses on 
government which are worse than losses in case of conflict, while at the same time such 
redistribution should not be higher than the proportion which would cause rebels 
suffering of legitimacy loss exceeding the suffering of costs of conflict. Particularly in 
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cases, when costs of conflict for rebels approach to 0, the range of redistributed 
resources will be below the rate that would be satisfactory for rebels.  
Knowing that  ΔLr =-ΔLr, we can check if there is a minimal level of revenues 
necessary to sustain such peace. Combining equations of optimal changes of legitimacy 
for both actors we find: 
Cr≥-F-Cg,  (14) 
thus  
F≥ -Cr-Cg.  (15) 
Meaning that any revenues from FDI (even absence of such) would be enough to 
sustain peace equilibrium. That is in line with the rationale that change in legitimacy is 
a function of revenues and redistribution and thus constraint by the revenues. So that 
absence of revenues would mean absence of change of legitimacy and thus absence of 
commitment problems. 
 
Two-Actor Model: FDI with Positive or Negative Economic Externalities 
This game is based on the same assumptions as the preceding one. The main 
difference is that this model takes into account that as an investment can have effects 
other from just revenue for government. Positive externalities of investment may 
include such benefits for the local population as higher employment, technology and 
knowledge transfer, new services for the locals (such as road construction), new 
linkages within the market etc., any initiation of violence will impose opportunity costs 
for rebels themselves or the people willing to join rebels in case of rebel-initiated 
conflict. Such effect would not hold for the government initiated conflict as the 
government has a fixed army which is not affected by the local opportunity costs of the 
region. The assumption is that entrance of an investor regardless of government’s 
policies on revenues may create immediate externalities (i.e. employment) even before 
it is possible to observe governmental policies or their effects. Such positive economic 
externalities by the population would impose additional costs on the rebels going to 
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defy on the peace agreement, due to the possibility of loss of such externalities in case 
of conflict relapse.   
On the other hand, an investment may not bring any positive externality for local 
population (if due to lack of sufficient human capital only outsiders work at the 
investment site, the products are not oriented on local market, local economy is not able 
to establish linkages etc.), while instead causing negative externalities such as pollution, 
health problems, confiscation of common lands etc. In this case presence on an investor 
may cause additional grievance on the part of population as government would benefit 
from the investment, while locals will be harmed by it. Thus even presence of such 
investment irrespectively of redistribution policy of government may decrease support 
of population to the government and increase legitimacy of rebels. As a result such 
negative economic externalities do not create an additional opportunity cost for rebels, 
but in opposite increase local support to them in case of rebellion (such support may not 
be related to legitimacy balance as those joining the cause may join just to fight against 
the investors and not against the government per se).   
Strategies and Payoffs for the case of investment with Positive Externalities: 
 Strategies available for both parties remain the same, where Rebels can either 
comply or defy, while the Government may choose out of following actions: 
[redistribute, not redistribute, comply, defy]. The sequence of actions remains the same: 
[State – Rebels – State], the only changing feature in this model is that initiation of a 
war puts an additional cost of economic externalities Ec on the rebels. The cost is higher 
in cases with higher benefits of the investment for the local society.  
 The payoffs for the available strategy sets are given below: 
U(G;R): [(Redistribute-Comply), (Comply)] =((1-x+ΔLg)+F; x – ΔLr)  
U(G;R) : [(Redistribute-Defy), (Comply)] =((1-x)-t-Cg; x-Cr ) 
U(G; R): [(Redistribute), (Defy)] = (1-x-Cg; x-Cr-Ec) 
U(G;R): [(Not redistribute, Comply), (Comply)] = ((1-x-ΔLg)+F; x+ΔLr-Cr)  
U(G;R): [(Not redistribute-Defy), (Comply)] = ((1-x)-t-Cg; x-Cr) 
U(G;R): [Not redistribute, Defy] = ((1-x) -Cg; x-Cr) 
41 
 
  
 
Solution via Backward Induction: 
When choosing whether to comply or defy in the sub-game ‘Redistribute’ the 
government compares possible outcomes or own actions. As outcome of compliancy 
((1-x+ΔLg)+F) is obviously better than ((1-x)-l-Ec), the government is likely to prefer 
compliance to defection.  
In the sub-game ‘Not redistribute’ the government choosing between compliance 
and defection again is likely to comply if government values revenues of FDI higher 
than it values the related change in legitimacy or at least if revenues of FDI can 
compensate to the government the loss of legitimacy at least to such a point that will be 
more preferable than suffering of costs of conflict and damaged trust – (i.e. if (-
ΔLg+F)>(-t-Cg)). As was mentioned above such choice is expectable if the FDI-related 
investments are vital for the government as in cases of FDI in natural resources cases. 
Though if this condition does not hold, the government is expected to renege on the 
previous agreement and restart conflict.  
Rebels also choose between a payoff for defying and complying keeping in mind 
that the most probable action of government is to comply.  Therefore, rebels choose 
between the outcomes of (x- ΔLr) and (x-Ec-Cr) in the sub-game where government 
redistributes the profit from investment and between (x+ ΔLr) and (x-Ec-Cr) in the sub-
game where government does not redistribute the profit. If Ec – economic externalities 
of the foreign investment is positive, than clearly that in the second sub-game rebels 
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Figure 4: Two-Actor Game with Economic Externalities 
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would prefer to comply. (Case of negative externalities will be examined below). 
Knowing that rebels would comply in the ‘non-redistribute’ scenario, we should focus 
on the ‘redistribute scenario’ as payoffs for all possible solutions of this scenario for 
government are higher than payoff for mutual compliance with the agreement in the 
second sub-game. 
Thus the main question is whether the rebels will comply or defy on the peace 
agreement under the ‘redistribute scenario’. The rebels will have to choose between the 
outcome where their legitimacy will decrease as a result of successful redistribution of 
profits by the government (x-ΔLr) and the case where they will face opportunity cost 
due to elimination of positive externalities of the investment (thus the payoff for defying 
of rebels in this context is (x-Ec-Cr)).   
Accordingly, considering the additional costs of initiating a conflict in the 
presence of indirect benefits of the investment for the local population, the rebels will 
be likely to defy only if cost of elimination of positive externalities of FDI will be lower 
than the cost of decrease of their legitimacy. Otherwise, the peace will prevail if the 
costs of elimination of the external benefits of the investment will be even higher than 
decrease in rebels’ legitimacy due to redistribution of the investment revenues by the 
government.  
As a result the government will prefer to redistribute FDI related resources and 
increase own legitimacy when FDI has a capacity of creating opportunity costs that 
perceived by the rebels as more important than decrease in their own legitimacy. Such 
situation may happen when the rebels and the local population may successfully 
integrate into the peaceful economy and fully benefit from peace. In this case a 
sustainable peace may be expected with gradual full integration of the society and 
development in the region together with consolidation of the state
8
.  
However, in cases where such positive externalities are perceived by rebels as less 
important than the change in their legitimacy, the rebels are likely to defy (in the sub-
game ‘redistribute’). Therefore, the government expecting such outcome would be 
likely to refrain from redistributive policies and prefer the non-redistributive strategy 
                                                          
8 Kurtenbach (2009) notes statebuilding and peacebuilding sometimes may need contradictory strategies, as 
successful peacebuilding may need acceptance of ‘multiple sovereignties’ while state-building focuses on 
consolidation of unique state sovereignty (Kurtenbach, 2009, p. 8).Therefore, a situation where both goals of 
sustaining peace and strengthening the governments sovereignty is a rare example of successful post-conflict 
transformation.  
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(given that government values F more than ΔLg). Thus, the second possible equilibrium 
in this model is [(NR-C) (C)] scenario, where the peace will be kept in the short run, but 
the latent conflict will persist. 
 However, if government fails to estimate the rebels preferences between change 
in legitimacy ΔLr and opportunity cost Ec, or if the governments the government 
estimates them right, but values the net effect of decreasing legitimacy and revenue 
obtained (-ΔLg + F) as even less desirable than cost of war, than the equilibrium of the 
model will be the [(R) (D)] scenario where the conflict will recur because both 
government and rebels will try to maximize own bargaining position and perceiving a 
threat of defection from the opposite party will prefer immediate conflict.  
Though such outcome could be seen as not expectable, the real life examples 
show that such tensions between the rebels and the government indeed take  place 
during the post-conflict period. A Turkish case of the peace process with PKK 
insurgency may exemplify the scenario where new governmental (non-military per se) 
investments are perceived as strategic threat to the rebel group and are often targeted by 
violent attacks(7, 2015), while at the same time a large amount of private investment 
has entered the region thus creating opportunity costs for local support to the group (and 
such investors are rarely targeted by violent attacks). Though in order to claim the 
particular relations between the preferences of the rebels between the changing 
legitimacy and new opportunity costs, broad qualitative case study would be required,  
even based on anecdotal evidence it is possible to say that the legitimacy and 
opportunity costs of investments of Turkey are pushing the situation in opposite 
directions. And such contradictory nature of investment-redistribution mechanism may 
be seen in the persisting sporadic violence neither turning into a  renewed conflict nor 
letting the peace consolidate. As in such case defining of a scope of redistribution 
(instead of yes-no definition) may be necessary in order to create a policy for 
sustainable peacebuilding (in order to reach the [(RC),(C)] equilibrium). .  
Before examining redistributive policies as a continuous value in order to define 
such peace-inducing redistribution scope, we will shortly look into the outcome of the 
same model given that the economic externalities of FDI are negative. Such 
externalities may create additional strength for the rebels, for example in case if loss of 
habitats due to negative environmental consequences of FDI, may lead to active 
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participation in the rebel troops of the people who would otherwise support the rebels in 
a more passive way (due to lack of any other opportunity, lack of income etc). In this 
case the model presented above will remain fully the same with only difference that Ec 
now is a variable negative in sign.  
As such scenarios are often peculiar to natural-resources FDI such as oil or 
uranium mining, gold extraction etc., we assume that the government values revenues F 
much higher than change in legitimacy ΔLg. Thus the government will prefer to commit 
to peace in both sub-games. The rebels in turn will prefer defection in the ‘redistribute’ 
sub-game and keeping peace in the ‘not redistribute’ sub-game. As a result the 
government will prefer not to redistribute the revenues, thus the sole equilibrium in the 
model of negative economic externalities of FDI is expected to be [(NR-C), (C)]. Once 
again though this equilibrium will keep peace in the short run, it will contribute little to 
the consolidation of state authority over the dispute territory, and more importantly, the 
latent conflict will persist, thus paving a way for a new conflict with strengthened rebels 
in the long run.  
Examination of Redistribution as a Continuous Variable 
Again as ΔLg is a function of redistribution of governmental revenues from FDI 
(ΔLg=f(r.F) – change in legitimacy as function of rate (r) that is going to be redistributed 
out of F), the possibility of a continuous range of rates of redistribution from 0 to 1, 
creates a possibility of variations of the size of ΔLg. The changes in legitimacies of 
governments and rebels interact as follows: ΔLg= -ΔLr. All other variables remain as 
defined above in the ‘Two-actor game with economic externalities’. This model is also 
solved by backward induction. 
Utility functions of peace and conflict for the government are as follows: 
Ug(peace)= (1-x)+ ΔLg+F (16) 
(where ΔLg can be either positive or negative).  
Ug(conflict)= (1-x)-Cg (17) 
As the peace is possible when government values utility of peace higher or equal 
to the utility of conflict (i.e. U(peace) ≥ U (conflict)), the optimal level of change of 
legitimacy (and thus redistribution) is as follows: 
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ΔLg
*≥-F-Cg. (18) 
This equation means that government will prefer peace in any situation when the 
change in its legitimacy will incur fewer losses than the loss expected from cost of 
conflict and withering of FDI revenues. Hence, that the government can tolerate some 
amount of negative change of legitimacy and still keep peace. As a result a peace 
inducing redistribution should designed in such a way as to result in legitimacy change 
in valued by government in range [–F-Cg; +∞) 
To find the range of legitimacy change acceptable for rebels we define their utility 
functions as follows: 
Ur(peace)=x+ ΔLr (19) 
Ur(conflict)=x-Cr-Ec. (20) 
Thus the change of legitimacy for rebels that will allow for their keeping peace is: 
  ΔLr
*≥-Cr-Ec,  (21) 
  (meaning that decrease in ΔLr is tolerable till -Cr-Ec) 
This equation means that the rebels can tolerate loss of legitimacy until it creates 
more harm than their losses which would occur in case of conflict. If we combine 
equations (A) and (B) and substitute ΔLr by ΔLg from (based on the idea that ΔLr = -
ΔLr) we find:  
-ΔLg
* ≥ -Cr-Ec; or in other terms   
 ΔLg
* ≤ Cr+Ec   (22) 
Thus the change in governmental legitimacy (as a function of redistribution) can 
be as follows: 
 –F-Cg  ≤  ΔLg
* ≤ Cr+Ec,  (23) 
and can be represented graphically as given on the Figure below (the figure in blue 
states for the range of ΔLg that would induce peace, while white areas account for the 
ranges of ΔLg where recurrence of conflict is expected. On the left side the expected 
defector of peace is the government; on the right side the expected defector of peace are 
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the rebels.  The figure shows that absence of redistribution whatsoever may cause war, 
while too much redistribution inducing significant change of balance of power can also 
lead to conflict recurrence.  
 
Figure 5: Peace and the Scope of Shift of Legitimacy induced by Redistribution of FDI 
related revenues 
 
These results predict that the peace may prevail if redistribution of FDI related 
revenues by the government will be within the defined range. The figure assumes that 
Ec is positive and, therefore, shows that peace can be sustained even with some increase 
of government’s legitimacy (up to the point that will be valued by the rebels as costlier 
than the opportunity cost and the cost of conflict).  It is necessary to point, however, that 
if Ec is negative, the most possible outcome is that all the range of peace inducing ΔLg 
will follow on the negative side of the graph.  
We can also check if there is a minimal level of revenues necessary to sustain 
such peace. Combining equations of optimal changes of legitimacy for both actors we 
find: 
Cr+Ec≥-F-Cg, thus F≥ -Cr-Cg-Ec. While the result seems to show that the amount 
of governmental revenues of FDI is not important for FDI with positive externalities, 
the situation is opposite for FDI with negative externalities (when Ec<0). In such case if 
the absolute value of negative externalities exceeds the absolute value of the sum of 
costs of conflict for the government and the rebels, then the governmental revenue from 
Peace
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FDI should be at least less or equal than the difference between the value of negative 
externalities and the sum of the costs of conflict.  
Three-Actor Model 
Now when we have modeled the interaction between the government and the 
rebels taking place after foreign direct investment enters a disputed area, we examine 
whether investor can and have incentives to influence the government-rebels 
interactions. The expanded model presenting this mechanism is presented below. 
The model presents three actors, two of which are sides of a currently settled 
conflict (i.e. the government and the rebels). The remaining one is an external actor (i.e. 
the foreign investor) entering this local post-conflict scene. The Nigerian government 
and MEND insurgency in Niger Delta, Turkish Government and PKK, Columbian 
government and FARC, Nigerien government and Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ) 
exemplify such conflicting government-rebel group dyads. The oil producing company 
Shell in the Niger Delta in Nigeria, or uranium extracting French company AREVA in 
Niger experiencing negative impacts of the conflict between the government and local 
Tuareg insurgency MNJ exemplify potential third party investors.  The investor is 
assumed to be impartial and acting only in accordance with the rationale of profit 
maximization for itself. 
We assume that the government and rebels have already signed an initial peace 
agreement which puts the conflict at stage of transition. Hence, we assume a state of 
(albeit tentative) peace with no immediate pending crisis risking immediate recurrence 
of violence. The government’s aim, therefore, is to consolidate peace and to solidify its 
control over the region at the same time. Towards that end, the government aims to 
foster economic development in the region.  Securing foreign investment in this post-
conflict zone constitutes a critical step in attaining such economic development
9
, as 
economic development can reduce poverty and economic grievances of the population 
and thus reduce risks of war recurrence (Walter 2004). Indeed national governments 
often spend a lot of effort to attract foreign investors. For instance, the Nigerian 
government, between 2005 and 2007, visited various Asian countries and conducted a 
series of meetings to attract local investors there.  
                                                          
9 See Campos and Kinoshita (2002), Alfaro et al (2004), Azman-Saini, Law, and Ahmad (2010) for the relationship 
between FDI and economic development 
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Our game models the interaction between all the three parties, namely the 
government, the rebel group and the foreign investor. The interaction is shown in the 
Figure 2. The game starts when the investor, already having decided to enter the post-
conflict market, decides what kind and what scope of business activities to pursue 
(whether to follow vertical or horizontal model of multinational enterprise, whether to 
engage in one business activity or more)  and whether it will also allocate resources as a 
part of its corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs (such as schools, hospitals, 
etc.), and if the company decides to do so, to what extent the size of this allocation will 
be. For instance, in Niger a French mining company AREVA funds two local hospitals 
providing free care for local community, emergency aid and some educational programs 
(AREVA, 2011). Investor can either just conduct own economic activities without 
engagement with local community. However, the type of economic activities pursued 
by the investor will determine the presence and scope of positive or negative economic 
externalities inflicted by the investor’s operations on the local population. Investor can 
also engage in social responsibility programs (often contributing to the local peace 
building programs), or provide some social support or infrastructural development for 
the local community without necessary need for such infrastructure for the business 
itself.  
Moreover, the foreign direct investment, when operating, creates revenue for the 
government, such as tax revenue, royalties and/or shared profits from operations. We 
call this revenue of the government FDI spoils. The government decides whether to 
redistribute such revenues for the local population or divert these resources for other 
purposes (e.g. to other regions, for its clientelistic networks, for military purposes etc). 
The rebel organization, observing the government’s action regarding the redistribution 
of FDI spoils, then decides whether to keep peace or reignite conflict. If the rebels 
attack, the game ends. If the rebel group decides to keep the peace, the government then 
decides whether it should honor the initial settlement or defy and try to eliminate rebels.  
To sum up the basic interactions and outcome are as follows. The government can 
redistribute or not redistribute FDI-related profits what will affect the population’s 
support the government enjoys in the disputed territory. The governmental policy thus 
will change governmental legitimacy in the region by ΔLg, which will translate in a 
proportional change in the rebels’ legitimacy by ΔLr, as legitimacies of the rebels and 
government are mutually exclusive and their sum is equal to 1. The government and the 
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rebels have initial balance of power represented as a share X of the government’s 
resources provided to the rebels to satisfy their demands, while the government keeps 
itself 1-X of the resources. Moreover, if conflict recurs both sides will suffer from costs 
of conflict, where Cg is the cost of conflict for government, and Cr is the cost of conflict 
for the rebels.  
Finally the investment produces opportunity costs for rebels. Such costs are based 
on positive economic externalities (Ec) of FDI and community’s benefits from the 
corporate social responsibility programs (Sr). The economic externalities (Ec) of FDI 
may also be negative and incentivize rebels to restart conflict. Investor has a potential to 
increase or decrease such economic externalities and benefits of social responsibility 
programs (CSR program inflicts an additional cost on investor (Csr)). In order to make 
such decision investor analyzes prospects of war or peace. If peace prevails investor 
will earn profit f(I) (where f(I) is a function of the investment I) and pay maintenance 
cost (Cm). In case of war, however, investor does not receive any profit as business 
operations are likely to at diminish or stop during the crisis, at the same time investor 
will still pay maintenance costs Cm and face a possibility of full destruction of the 
investment capital (machinery, building etc) shown in the model as a(I) – where a is the 
probability of destruction of the whole investment capital I. The expected payoffs for all 
this strategies are given in the figure and table below. 
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Table 1: Payoffs of the Rebels, the Government and Investor in Three-Actor-Game 
 
Solving using the backward induction technique we know that on the latest stage 
of the 'No CSR-Redistribute' sub-game the Government will definitely prefer to comply 
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Figure 6: Strategic Interaction between Investors, Rebels and State 
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also prefer to comply if the revenues from FDI offset for the government the harm of 
decreasing legitimacy at least to the extent where such harm will be less costly for the 
government than costs of war and international investors’ trust.   
The rebels, in turn, in the 'No CSR - Not Redistribute' sub-game, will prefer to 
comply (thus sub-game equilibrium for this scenario will be sustenance of peace with 
latent conflict), while in the 'No CSR - Redistribute' sub-game the decision of rebels 
will depend on the preference of rebels between ΔLr (change in rebels’ Legitimacy) and 
Ec (opportunity cost of economic externalities of the FDI) combined with the cost of 
conflict. The preference in turn depends on the balance between the scope of 
opportunity costs created by FDI for population and rebels, and on the magnitude of 
expected decrease in populations’ support provided to rebels. If the rebels expect that 
opportunities provided by the economic externalities of FDI will not be able to offset 
their loss of legitimacy (and the associated risks of losing some bargaining power) due 
to rising support of population to the government, then the rebels will prefer to defy on 
the initial settlement in order to secure initial balance of power. Hence the sub-game 
equilibrium for ‘No CSR-Redistribute’ will be the recurrence of conflict due to rebels’ 
defection. The case of negative economic externalities will result in the same outcome.  
In contrast, if positive externalities of investments will create opportunity costs 
exceeding the costs of decreasing legitimacy of the rebels, the rebels will prefer to keep 
peace and the equilibrium in this sub-game will be the peace with latent-conflict. Thus 
the government will make the initial decision of redistribution or not redistribution of 
the FDI-related revenues by analyzing the following conditions:  
1) The state’s preferences between ΔLg and F, and the costs of conflict, and: 
2) The rebels preferences between ΔLr and Ec, and costs of conflict (or the preferences 
of rebels between ΔLr and Ec combined with Cs and costs of conflict).  
In case when government values FDI-related profits higher than the change in 
legitimacy (or at least makes offsets such change in legitimacy to a point when it is seen 
by the government as less costly than conflict relapse), and the rebels value change in 
legitimacy as more important than opportunity costs induced by FDI the expected 
equilibrium of the (No CSR) sub-game would be [(Not Redistribute-Comply) 
(Comply)], - prevalence of peace despite persisting latent conflict. In the CSR sub-game 
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the outcome is the same if opportunity costs created by the CSR program does not 
increase the total costs of rebels defection to outweigh their harms in case of decrease of 
their legitimacy by  ΔLr. If, on the contrary, the CSR program does makes the total costs 
of defection for rebels higher than the cost of decrease of their legitimacy, than the 
‘CSR’ sub-game equilibrium would be [(Redistribute, Comply) (Comply) ]. However, 
irrespectively of the equilibrium in the CSR sub-game, as in short run investor is 
indifferent between the payoffs of any peace (with or without latent conflict), the 
investor would not have incentives to engage in costly CSR programs or to increase 
positive externalities (or decrease negative externalities) of own business. Thus the most 
expected equilibrium in this game is [(No CSR) (Not Redistribute, Comply) (Comply)]. 
However, it is necessary to mention that, considering the persistence of latent 
conflict in this equilibrium, in the long run investor ideally may be better to increase 
positive economic externalities of own activities and CSR spending to enable 
government to more to a more sustainable equilibrium of [CSR) (Redistribute, Comply) 
(Comply)] if such shift is possible. (In fact such shift may be very difficult because as 
we mentioned above the setting where government prefers FDI-related revenues to 
legitimacy emerge in a countries with natural resources endowments, as resources 
extracted by foreign investors often provide the main source for governmental budget. 
At the same time such investments tend not to produce large positive economic 
externalities due to their vertical business models
10
, or even produce negative 
externalities such as environmental degradation. As a result, only if the investor is able 
to conduct large-scale developmental projects significantly benefitting the local society, 
can such CSR lead (without additional external factors such as aid/internationally 
funded developmental programs) to a change in the equilibrium to peace without latent 
conflict. However, even in this case such FDI-funded developmental programs may rise 
questions on the sovereignty of the state what can endanger the process of state-
building.) Alternatively, investor’s engagement in CSR may be advisable in order to 
prevent direct attacks on investor’s facilities from the local population or rebels (as we 
mentioned above sporadic attacks are possible during post-conflict periods even without 
necessary return to conflict), or due to other motivations not considered in this paper 
(such as international recognition, increase of efficiency of local operations etc).  
                                                          
10
 The relation between positive spillovers and different models of FDI is discussed on the pp. 12-13. 
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Nigeria can exemplify such case as the oil production in the Niger delta region 
with low benefits for the local population and high negative effects including 
environmental degradation bring a case where economic externalities are even negative, 
and thus utility of ΔLr for rebels is definitely higher than utility of Ec. At the same time 
the high scale oil production in Nigeria providing an important source for Nigerian 
budget, makes government value FDI-related revenues F as more important than the 
decrease of its legitimacy in the region. As a result, the government in such conditions 
follows the strategy of (not redistribute, comply) what brings an uneasy peace in the 
region with persistent grievances of the population. The CSR program related evidence 
suggests that although some companies as Areva engage in such activities in Niger, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that population do not perceive such programs as even 
offsetting the negative externalities of Areva’s operations ("Niger: Residents of 
Uranium Mining Town Fear They Are Being Exposed to Radioactive Poisoning," 
2005), thus such CSR activities do not show a potential of changing current equilibrium.  
In contrast, if government perceives change in legitimacy as less important than 
FDI-related revenues, while rebels perceive opportunity costs of economic externalities 
of FDI as more important than decrease of own legitimacy, than an equilibrium would 
be reached at [(No CSR)(Redistribute, Comply) (Comply)] consolidating peace and 
state’s control. However, such settings are highly unlikely as profits making 
governments to neglect loss in legitimacy are usually coming from natural resources 
FDI having little positive economic externalities. At the same time such preferences of 
rebels are possible only if economic externalities are high. Such externalities may be 
more often (but not necessary) provided by FDI in services, infrastructure or 
manufacturing (still governmental regulation, development of local human capital and 
other factors limiting capacity of local community to absorb such positive externalities). 
Therefore, we leave this equilibrium without broad discussion, as while arithmetically it 
is possible, the conditions prevailing in the post-conflict countries with existing models 
of business are not likely to satisfy conditions necessary for such equilibrium.   
A different situation emerges when the government perceives negative change in 
own legitimacy as more harmful than loss of FDI related revenues and costs of renewed 
conflict. In such case in the ‘No CSR’ sub-game there are two probable equilibriums. 
The first is peace, which is expectable if rebels would perceive loss of the positive 
economic externalities of FDI as more harmful than loss of some legitimacy to the 
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government (if Ec˃ ΔLr). Thus if rebels would estimate Ec+Cr˃ ΔLr, then peace will be 
sustained with the best possible terms for government (providing increase in legitimacy 
and economic development at the same time). On the other hand if rebels would deem 
decrease in legitimacy as more harmful than the loss of positive externalities of FDI and 
suffering costs of conflict, then the rebels are likely to renege on the initial settlement 
and the conflict will recur (the alternative ‘No CSR’ sub-game equilibrium). Thus in 
this case the value of positive externalities of investment is crucial for the balance 
between peace and conflict as it defines which of the two possible equilibriums will be 
realized.  
The equilibriums are similar in the ‘CSR’ sub-game with only difference that 
rebels should compare the values of ΔLr (change in legitimacy induced by governmental 
redistribution of FDI-related revenues) and Ec+Cr+Cs (the sum of opportunity costs 
induced by positive economic externalities of FDI and CSR programs funded by the 
investor and the cost of conflict). Thus when investor decides in such settings whether 
to fund a CSR program and whether to follow a business model to maximize economic 
externalities for the local population, the investor firstly defines whether peace is 
possible without such costly CSR program. And if not whether a CSR program can 
increase the total of costs of conflict for rebels to such extent, so that the rebels would 
prefer peace despite decrease in their legitimacy due to redistributive policies of the 
government. If even without a CSR program, peace is possible (if rebels value 
ΔLr˂Ec+Cr), then investor will not have incentive to conduct such program as the best 
possible outcome will be already at place. (This proposition does not imply that the 
investor definitely will not or should not initiate in such program – on the contrary 
additional opportunities provided by CSR would even strengthen such equilibrium, as 
well as bring the investor other possible benefits (such as international recognition, 
some tax exemption provided by the government, and other factors not accounted in our 
model). Thus under such conditions equilibrium will be [(No SCR) (Redistribute, 
Comply) (Redistribute)]. 
Similarly, if even with an affordable for investor CSR program peace cannot be 
sustained (if rebels value ΔLr˃Ec+Cr+Cs and thus believe that risk of loss of all 
opportunity costs and of suffering cost of war is less harmful than a threat due to 
probability that government will renege on its commitments after the end of the period – 
when governments legitimacy and, hence, bargaining power will increase), the investor 
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will not have incentive to engage in such program. Such situation may emerge when 
economic externalities of investment are low due to the character of investment. As a 
result, equilibrium under such conditions will be [(No SCR) (Redistribute-Comply) 
(Defy)]. Again, even though SCR programs are not expected to efficiently contribute to 
peace, they still may be useful for investors in order to reduce the risks of capital 
destruction in case of conflict recurrence and for other reasons cited earlier.  
And only if the rebels value change in legitimacy pretty close to the opportunity 
costs of conflict and thus the rebels may hesitate between engaging in conflict or 
sustaining peace, CSR programs initiated by foreign investors will have the largest 
effect as it can create additional opportunity costs for rebels’ defection on the existing 
peace, and thus such programs would prevent rebels’ defection and help consolidate 
peace. As in such case investor chooses between spending extra funds for such 
programs or risking loss of all revenues for a period of conflict, or even risking loss of 
all or part of the capital invested due to possibility of its destruction or impossibility to 
move such capital out of the region (such forms of investments may include factories, 
office-buildings, infrastructural projects), the investor will prefer initiating such 
program. Therefore, in this case the equilibrium of the game will be [(CSR) 
(Redistribute-Comply) (Comply)] – peace with decreasing grievances of the local 
population, consolidation of state power and effective interaction between business and 
society. In order to reach such equilibrium, however, the government, civil society and 
investor should spend much effort in order to maximize positive externalities of the 
CSR programs (considering that countries usually have more than one foreign investor, 
implementation of different CSR programs without coordination or strategic planning 
may not bring positive effects despite funds spent).  
Results: 
To sum up, if government values loss of revenues obtained from FDI as more important 
than the decrease in own legitimacy in the region (F>ΔLg) or at least as able to 
minimize costs of such decrease in legitimacy to be less than the cost of conflict (F-
ΔLg>-Cr), in the short run peace will be sustained. However, a risk for the government 
may loom on the horizon. The population will be dissatisfied with lack or insufficient 
redistribution of revenues accrued by government in their region. Thus the legitimacy of 
rebels will be increasing in the longer run in the eyes of the local population. Such an 
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increase in the legitimacy of the rebels, then may translate into further rebel demands. 
In conflict terms such FDI induced equilibrium will sustain persistence of latent conflict 
and thus keep the risk of breakdown of peace in the long run. CSR program is not likely 
to produce a considerable effect on turning such peace into more sustainable one, 
whoever  
Secondly, if government values consolidation of own control over the region more 
than revenues from FDI, the peace is dependent on the scope of positive economic 
externalities of foreign direct investment. If such externalities create opportunity costs 
perceived by rebels as higher than costs of legitimacy decreasing due to governmental 
redistributive policies, peace will prevail. Otherwise, if such opportunity costs are not 
enough to compensate for legitimacy loss of rebels, recurrence of conflict is expected. 
CSR programs under these conditions may only be effective if the rebels’ preferences 
between the opportunity costs and the cost of legitimacy loss are very close to each 
other and can be shifted in favor of peace by the CSR programs.   
Examination of Redistribution as a Continuous Variable  
From our previous examination we know that in the No SCR sub-game 
equilibrium, the change of legitimacy (dependant on the rate of redistribution) that can 
be tolerated by both government and rebels is as follows: 
–F-Cg  ≤  ΔLg
* ≤ Cr+Ec, (26) 
If we repeat all the steps accounting for opportunity costs created for rebels by CSR 
programs, we will find alternative range of: 
–F-Cg  ≤  ΔLg
* ≤ Cr+Ec, (27) 
Which can be represented on the figure below as follows:  
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Figure 7 Peace and the Scope of Shift of Legitimacy accounting for Economic 
Externalities of FDI and CSR programs 
These results show that initiation of a CSR may increase the range of changes in 
legitimacy acceptable for both parties (more particularly in this case it increases 
tolerance of rebels and thus allows government to provide more resources for the 
contested region. However, as we know from the three-actor game described above the 
instances when investor will have such CSR programs are rather limited.  
Still if we check the level of revenues necessary to sustain such peace, we can 
observe an interesting relation: when we combine equations of the changes of 
legitimacies acceptable by both parties, we find that the necessary minimum FDI related 
revenues should be:  
F≥ -Cr-Cg-Ec-Cs,  
What shows that the governments sometimes may have to tolerate some costs 
associated with the foreign investment (providing subsidies etc.) in order to sustain 
peace.  
  
Peace
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CHAPTER 6 
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDIES 
 
 
In order to provide illustration for the model of the strategic interaction between the 
government, the rebels and investors we present three short-cases studies on Niger, 
Nigeria and Turkey. All three of these countries have recently experienced intra-state 
conflicts and are currently on post-conflict stage. All three of them sometimes 
experience some forms of violence which raises questions on whether their conflicts are 
going to recur, however, in neither country the government had officially declared an 
end to peace process (or ceasefire). These case studies are based on anecdotal evidence 
from such secondary sources as newspapers, reports and journal articles. The Niger and 
Nigeria are presented from a multiple-case study perspective to provide different 
accounts of similar mechanisms of post-conflict settings. The Turkey’s case is 
significantly different from the other two cases and is presented here in order to 
illustrate alternative type of settings.  
Case-study: Niger, persistent grievances and relative peace 
Niger provides an illustration for a case when the government is ready/or has to 
tolerate loss of own legitimacy in the region for the sake of financial inflows from 
foreign investment maintaining economy of the country and governmental capacity. At 
the same time rebels of the country despite perceived unequal distribution of the 
revenue tend to keep ceasefire unless there is an additional external trigger.  
Niger has experienced a civil conflict between ethnic Tuareg minority and the 
government in 1990-1995 (CIDCM, 2006). The main demands of the rebels at that time 
were cultural and political rights and representation with some reference to economic 
development. In 1995-1997 a settlement was reached after some advances of the official 
army and a truce was enforced (CIDCM, 2006).  
Despite settlement and some retribution/reconciliation strategies implemented by 
the government, the core grievances of the rebels were not addressed and related 
grievances fueled growing frustration. Such grievances included marginalization and 
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discrimination, and underinvestment of government into regional development while 
the region was providing 72% of Nigerien exports thanks to its uranium resources 
(Emerson, 2011). Moreover, the uranium mining activities put environmental conditions 
of the region under risk and increasing interest to this resource from European and 
Asian investors led to even further rise in the mining activities.  
Though such grievances were present for a long time and complains that 
investment was ‘not helping the region economically’ but was causing environmental 
and health problems has been voiced since 2003 ("NIGER: New Tuareg Rebel Group 
Speaks Out," 2007), the conflict recurred only in 2008 when it was triggered by Tuareg 
revolt in Mali and governmental arrests of Tuareg minister Rhissa Ag Boula (CIDCM, 
2010). Only then redistribution of uranium production related revenues became one of 
the main concerns and demands of armed rebels. In fact in July 2008, the leader of MNJ 
Aghaly Ag Alambo demanded redistribution of 20-30 per cent of all uranium revenue in 
Niger to the northern region (Minority Rights Group International, 2008). 
In the period between the two conflicts several developments took place. 
Although Niger started producing uranium since 1957 even before its independence  
(IBP USA, 2011, p. 208), 2000s marked an important change in the uranium production 
in the country. Firstly, 2003 was a year when global price on uranium started to recover 
after more than 10 years of stagnation. Moreover, on the local level uranium production 
in Niger started to slowly increase (Alshanov, 2011) after relative drop in outputs of 
1999-2000. Furthermore, probably related to the rising level of global prices, since 2004 
one of the main uranium investors in Niger – Areva Group started to apply for 
additional permits for exploration (AREVA, 2009), while in 2006-2007 China entered 
Niger’s uranium market ("Uranium in Niger," 2015). To sum up, since 2000 influence 
of uranium FDI on the north of Niger was rising.  
The effect of these investments on the population was two-fold in line with the 
proposed model. On the one hand environmental problems related to uranium mining is 
reported in the region, they include air pollution, sale of ‘radioactive scrap metal from 
the uranium mill’ on local market, and contamination of drinking water above standards 
of World Health Organization which were identified in 2003-2004 (Chareyron, 2008). 
As employment provided by Areva in 2003 was below 2000 people allegedly most of 
them are brought from South of the country while local population can neither work at 
mines (due to lack of necessary qualifications) nor sustain their traditional way of life 
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(allegedly due to draining of natural waters by the mining activities) (Sourt, 2009). On 
the positive side of economic externalities it may be possible to cite use of 800 km road 
built in 1980s by the French uranium mining companies and electrical power 
transmission line benefitting both the mine and the nearby settlement  (IBP USA, 2011, 
p. 208). However, due to the fact such facilities were provided even before the conflict 
of 1990s it is possible to say that importance of such positive externalities could have 
diminished. Thus the net economic externalities (Ex) for the region were negative 
during the described period and, therefore, were not inflicting opportunity cost in case 
of conflict relapse.  
On the part of corporate social responsibility  (CSR) Areva has built and 
maintains  two hospitals (the announced maintenance cost of 1.7 million euro for 
2009)providing free care all regional population, they also fund some CSR programs 
including emergency aid and some forms of education (AREVA, 2011). Although 
hospitals could provide a source of public support for the company, the accusations of 
local NGOs, that the doctors in the hospitals underreport or cover up such professional 
disease s as lung cancer, show that it is not the case. Thus it is possible to say that 
although the company does engage in CSR activities, in the eyes of at least part of the 
local population, they do not fully compensate for the negative economic externalities, 
and thus are not expected to create opportunity cost in case of conflict recurrence.  
Considering the rebels justification for the revolt (economic marginalization, 
inequitable redistribution of resources) it is clearly that the government was or was 
perceived as following the non-redistribution tactic of the game explained in the 
previous chapter. In line with predictions of our model, no immediate war was expected 
as the government had incentives to keep peace and enjoy and expand revenues from 
the related investment. At the same time the rebels had reasons to keep the truce and 
increase own capacities while their legitimacy (support for them from the population) 
was increasing due to rising grievances of the local population. The model proposed 
that though such equilibrium produces peace in the short run, in the long run the latent 
conflict between the parties would exacerbate and new wave of violence was to erupt 
triggered by any exogenous event. Indeed what we have observed is that despite years 
of growing grievances about economic underdevelopment, absence of redistribution of 
FDI-related revenues and negative economic externalities of the FDI in the region the 
conflict did not erupt till 2007 when it was sparked by the similar conflict in the 
neighboring  Mali.  
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The rebellion was led by the Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ) which was 
attacking governmental facilities and carried out several attacks/kidnappings against 
foreign workers in the uranium mines (Emerson, 2011, p. 674). The conflict ended in 
2009 through a negotiated settlement brokered by Qaddafi and disarmament operations 
were introduced. Even though after the settlement the economic situation in the region 
did not change significantly, the large scale violence did not resume. Since 2009 much 
new investors from China, India, and Korea entered the region in surge for uranium 
("Uranium in Niger," 2015).  
The persistence of local grievances with the foreign investment is still in place 
what can be seen from such events as attack on French mining company AREVA’s 
facilities in the Somair uranium mine reported by the company in May 2013 (AREVA, 
2013). However, currently government had reach a new deal with the AREVA, 
according to which the company will spend 123 million USD to rebuilt the road which 
was constructed in 1980s and that it will fund a local development project worth of 17 
million USD ("Areva's uranium mining deal with Niger receives cautious welcome," 
2014). Moreover, in 2012 the government announced a 2.5 million USD Strategy for 
Development and Security (SDS) aiming to ‘devolve power to local communities’ for 
the northern areas that would be financed by the government and external partners 
(Lebovich, 2013), though reportedly not much of this program had been implemented 
yet. Such program apparently would on the one hand redistribute the revenues for the 
region, and at the same time it would solve the legitimacy-related commitment problem 
as it would integrate local community into the decision-making process. 
The new SCR projects by Areva may not be enough to compensate for (at least 
perceived) negative externalities of the uranium mining. Thus apparently the situation 
once again may only return to the stage of latent conflict, unless government can 
succeed in transferring power and finances to local communities at the same time.  
 
To sum up the developments in Niger and the recurrence of the conflict in 2007 
can be explained by the model proposed in this paper showing that equilibrium with no 
open warfare can be reached at the point, where the government enjoys large revenues 
from the investment, while rebels despite existing grievances among the population 
prefer to refrain from large-scale violence and increase own force instead.   
Case Study: Nigeria – Fragile Truce 
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Nigeria is another country endowed with natural resources (particularly oil) and 
having long history of violence. Similarly to Niger, the FDI in natural resources in 
Nigeria have been a problematic topic for a long time as it creates vital revenues for the 
government but also provides a source of conflict in the region of Niger Delta. In this 
case study we will examine Nigerian case in line with our model in order to see why 
truce is still in place and whether recurrence of conflict is expected under current 
conditions. We will firstly present a short overview of the conflict and then discuss the 
developments of the current post-conflict stage in Nigeria.  
Towards 2010 Nigeria became the 19th recipient of foreign capital in the world 
and accounted for 30% of overall FDI inflows in the African continent (Idowu & Awe, 
2014). While investment in oil sector remained the sector with largest presence of 
MNCs in Nigeria, it also attracted broad attention due to the impact of such investments 
on conflict in the country. Despite high revenues for the government from the oil 
production, local people received few benefits and remained impoverished. Moreover, 
oil extraction in Niger Delta negatively affected local people due to environmental 
effects of oil spillovers. According to the recent estimates cleaning up of which would 
require 30 years and 1 billion dollars to be cleaned-up, while the soils in some regions 
are contaminated for more than 5 meters deep (Vidal, 2011). As a result, of grievances 
related to economic underdevelopment and environmental problems in 1990s oil 
investors were opposed by wide protests and when the government repressed them, 
violence erupted in the country (Campbell & Carment, N.D.).   
The conflict continued for about 20 years with ups and downs and only in June 
2009 the government attempted to settle the conflict by offering 90 day long 
‘unconditional amnesty’ for the insurgency members (Canada: Immıgratıon and 
Refugee Board of Canada, 2011).  While firstly the offer was mostly rejected by 
militants,  later MEND - Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (one of the 
main militant groups of the conflict) announced unilateral ceasefire and towards autumn 
of that year almost all rebel leaders and about 26 000 militants accepted the amnesty  
(Canada: Immıgratıon and Refugee Board of Canada, 2011).   
The amnesty resulted in monthly payments and training programs for ex-
militants, however, it failed to address wider and deeper grievances of the local 
population despite rapid rise in revenues from the increased oil production (Canada: 
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Immıgratıon and Refugee Board of Canada, 2011), which fell before the amnesty by 
forth (McNamee, 2012). Although the wage payments to the militants continue, some 
got dissatisfied with lack of developmental changes or problems with distribution of the 
payments (Morehod.ru, 2011). Therefore, some militants renege the amnesty and 
carried out sporadic attacks, such as attack on oil trunk line in 2012 by a group called 
themselves also MEND though other MEND leaders continued cooperation with the 
state (McNamee, 2012).  
The government also had carried out several military raids against remaining 
(active) militant camps, some ex-MEND commander and militants accused of reneging 
the truce. In November 2010 about 60 militants were arrested after a military raid on 
their camps; the following month clashes continued between the Joint Military Task 
Force (JTF) and militant Niger Delta Liberation Force (NDLF) with alleged casualties 
of villages amounted to 50 (Okafor, 2011). In 2011 after a cross fire between military 
and NDLF, a new major military operation was conducted against a militant group 
accounting for 70-100 militants active in the area ("Nigerian soldiers attack militants in 
Niger Delta region," 2011). Despite such occasional violence neither the government 
nor the ex-rebels announced officially the end to ceasefire and new rebel groups do not 
engage in consistent warfare (rather conduct occasional attacks) 
Analyzing this conflict from a perspective offered by this paper, we can define 
the country as post-conflict as there was an amnesty as a start of a peace process with 
most of the militants still following the truce. Due to the rapid increase of oil production 
after the amnesty we can examine this case as close to the situation when investor 
entered after the ceasefire. Regarding the governmental announcement of redistribution 
of the profits we can examine the economic commitments made by government under 
the amnesty program.  However, although based on the conditions of the amnesty some 
payments were done and wages are still paid to the ex-rebels, such payments cannot be 
deemed as redistribution policy considered by our model. (Because our model uses 
population-centric approach and evaluates changes in legitimacy as induced by the 
reaction of population redistributive policies, such legitimacy-inducing redistribution 
should be focused the local society). Thus despite the large payouts to rebels the current 
interactions are realized in settings of the ‘Not redistribute’ sub-game.   
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Our model predicts that if the government does not redistribute the new FDI-
related revenues to the population the support of the population to the government will 
decrease, while rebels’ legitimacy will increase. As a result, the rebels are expected to 
keep peace and increase own power which is dependent on the rising grievances of the 
population. And such is the situation in the region. But is this situation in place and why 
a different set of policies did not take place? 
Our model predicts that such peace with latent conflict is likely in situation when 
rebels value change in legitimacy (i.e. population’s support/control over population) as 
more important than the opportunity costs provided by the foreign investor, while the 
government at the same time values revenues from FDI as more important than the 
change in the governments legitimacy in the region. The first condition is easily to 
establish in Nigerian case as the main source of FDI in the Niger Delta is oil. And as we 
had discussed in the literature review part, FDI in natural resources tends to produce 
minimum positive externalities, while on the contrary such FDI tends to create negative 
economic externalities such as oil spills in the Nigerian case. Thus, it is obvious that as 
positive externalities of FDI in Nigeria are low, the rebels would value their 
legitimacy/control over the population as more valuable than non-existing positive 
economic externalities. At the same time the government in Nigeria is highly dependent 
on the oil revenues – about 75 % of its budget comes from oil ("Nigeria forced to revise 
budget as oil prices remain low," 2014). Thus loss of some part of the revenues due to 
relapse of the conflict would mean for the government lost in the budget and thus 
decrease in the state’s capacity to operate. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the 
government values such revenues as more important than loss of some legitimacy in the 
region.  
If we consider constrains of the government and the nature of the FDI, it is clear 
that the behavior of Nigerian actors is consistent with propositions made by our model 
which would indeed predict latent conflict and persistence of population’s grievances. 
Therefore, it is possible to argue that the FDI in Nigerian case indeed acted as an 
incentive mechanism, providing the government incentives to keep peace, that it did not 
invoke the opportunity cost mechanism due to the lack of positive economic 
externalities. It is difficult though to account for legitimacy mechanism in this case as 
more detailed data is necessary. However, some accounts say that the lack of 
effectiveness of the economic part of the amnesty program was because the ex-rebel 
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leaders mismanaged the distribution of wages to low-rank rebels what led to even 
additional grievances and creation of alternative rebel factions (Morehod.ru, 2011). 
Though ideally such actions could be interpreted as challenge of the government’s 
legitimacy, this mismanagement of the program can be just the reflection of greed of 
those who wants to benefit from the governmental sources.  
To sum up, the Nigerian case supports the proposition of our model that in case 
of low positive economic externalities, and government’s preferences for revenues of 
FDI a peace is likely to be maintained in the short run, but in the long run the persistent 
latent conflict may once again turn into violence, because as grievances of population 
will rise the support for the state will follow and more people would be ready to support 
old (reneging) or new militant groups. Thus in the long run the ex-militants can either 
rise their demands and sustain policies favorable for them, or recurrence of the conflict 
can be sparked by any new variable.  
Case Study: Turkey 
We present a case of Turkey as a case of mechanism opposite those illustrated in 
analyses of Niger and Nigeria. However, we should notice several difficulties of 
analyzing Turkey from the perspective of our model. First of all, that the data on Turkey 
that we use, provides information on a total investment in the conflict affected region 
without differentiation between foreign and domestic investments. Secondly, while in 
Nigerian and Nigerien cases presence of FDI in natural resources resulted in the fact 
that the major investors in the affected regions were the mining companies of limited 
number, in Turkey the investment sectors promoted and growing in the affected region 
are comprised of large number of different companies in different sectors. Thirdly, 
because of such nature of the investment and lack of exact information of revenues from 
such investments, we will provide just tentative overview of the case adopting existing 
information to our model. The reason for our use of such case at all, is that, as our 
model defines four sets of different conditions that define the nature of interactions 
between the actors (based the relation between ΔLg  and F, between ΔLr and Ec),  this 
case significantly different from Niger and Nigeria will help us demonstrate some 
mechanisms of our model which could not be demonstrated in previous cases. 
Moreover, we acknowledge that as most contexts with similar characteristics of non-
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natural-resources FDI would provide similar difficulties, a reliable analysis of such 
cases would require much more systematic analysis based on broader range of sources.    
For more than 30 years Turkey experienced conflict between the government 
and militant Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) with violent clashes and casualties on both 
sides. Despite some advances in 2005-2009 and the subsequent Oslo Peace Process that 
took place in 2009-2011, the conflict renewed in 2012 with sporadic violence (Crisis 
Group 2014). However, continuation of secret meetings and negotiations between the 
government and one of the PKK leaders imprisoned Abdullah Ocalan led to a new 
phase of cease-fire announced publicly in the end of 2012 (Sputnik News 2015).  
A series of negotiations between Öcalan, active PKK arms in Kandil and 
European arms of PKK took place in February – March 2013 and led to announcement 
of unilateral ceasefire by PKK on March 23, 2013 (BBC 2012). Retreat of PKK from 
Turkey was planned to start on 8 May 2013 and the second stage of the peace process 
started on 24 June 2013, though was paused in September 2013 (ġimĢek 2015)  
Though a number of clashes and attacks took place since then, sides have not 
renounced the peace process officially, and the overall scale of violence has decreased 
comparatively to the pre-‘peace process’ period. The conflicting parties have started a 
peace process, some stages of it were implemented and overall war is absent. As at the 
beginning of this paper we defined post-conflict situation as a transition from war to 
peace or as a stage of conflict with absent war but risks of violence, it is possible to 
argue that Turkey is in the post-conflict stage now despite low scale violence.  
In order to understand the effect of investment on the dynamics of this state we 
can analyze the changes in governmental and private investment during the last years. 
On the investment side, firstly it is necessary to acknowledge that there is no major 
natural resources production; therefore, no one particular investor or sector accounts for 
the whole region. The main energy projects in the region – i.e. hydroelectric plants - are 
funded and operated by the central government (GAP 2014).  Apart from such state run 
enterprises towards 2015 investments in East regions of Turkey (which may be seen as 
the contested regions) had risen dramatically: during the five years from 2010 to 2015, 
capital investments in Siirt including FDI increased 26-fold reaching 867 million 
Turkish Liras from 34 million Turkish Liras in 2010, in Mardin during the same time 
period total investment volumes increased 10-fold, while in Batman a three-times 
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increase was observed ("Huzur ortamı Doğu'da ekonomiyi canlandırdı," 2015). Among 
the known foreign investors in the region there are MSA Brother International planned 
to invest 6 million dollars in Berçelan Water Packaging Factory in Hakkari (though no 
reports about its later activities are found, it is still listed on the Turkish Ministry of 
Economy web-site as a company operating in Turkey as of 30.06.2015(Ministry of 
Economy, 2015)), while a number of local manufacturing firms are investing in the 
regions as well (Ġlhan, 2010). Considering unemployment rates in the region hovering 
around 14.5% in South Anatolia, and around 21% in the Mardin, ġirnak, ġiirt and 
Batman regions of South-East Anatolia supporting mostly Kurdish political actors
11
   
(as opposed to the Turkish average of 9,7%) (GAP, 2014), the benefit these new 
economic enterprises provide in terms of employment and other economic externalities 
is notable.  
On the state-redistribution part as of 2011 the state was spending on the South-
East Anatolian region several times more than it was obtaining through taxes. Since the 
Oslo process the share of public investments in the South-East region was between 11% 
and 14% of country wide public investments (what accounted for expenditure of around 
14 billion of Turkish liras for the period of 5 years up to 2012), which is higher than in 
years previous to the start of peace processes (GAP 2014).  Moreover, the state-led 
South-East Anatolian Development Project (GAP) reports state investments into 
irrigation systems, and increase in exports and economic development policies 
implemented between 2008 and 2012 (GAP 2014). However, if we look into the 
revenue part of the state, we will see that the government actually minimizes potential 
revenues that can come from the private investment in the region. In 2012 the 
government announced that investors in the region will be exempted of taxes and will 
be enjoying subsidized interest rates (Babacan, 2012), with all domestic and foreign 
investors able to benefit from such policies.  It is important to note that such policies are 
not uniform around the country and the highest governmental support and tax 
reductions is proposed exactly for the regions of Eastern Turkey (Investment Support 
and Promotion Agency, n.d.).  
Though the evidence we provide is not systematic, it give an insight into the 
ongoing policy. As we see the government provides special policies in order to attract 
                                                          
11
 Definition made according to the voting results of 2014 these regions voted for pro-Kurdish political parties and 
individuals ("2014 Yerel Seçim Sonuçları," 2014).  
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domestic and foreign investor in the region while reducing own revenues to minimum 
(i.e. the investment policy for the region frees large, strategic and some other kinds of 
enterprises from income taxes at all). Moreover, the governmental expenditure on the 
region (through public investments etc) is remains high. Thus it is clear that considering 
our model, the government can be classified as one valuing change in own legitimacy 
more than the potential FDI related revenues.  Thus the current situation is characterized 
by high values of redistribution (or more properly public investment which is higher 
than the investment related revenues) and possible positive economic externalities such 
as employment and services provided by the firms. According to the model we can 
predict that in such case the government rebels will be making preference between the 
economic benefits of investment but losing some bargaining power against the state, 
and returning to conflict to preserve own bargaining power but losing positive 
externalities of investments in the region.  Thus attacks against governmental projects 
are possible if the risk of loss of bargaining power is perceived. While if the rebels 
value cost of losing economic externalities for the region higher than cost of such risk, 
the peace will prevail.  
 What we observe is that during the years of peace process the investments 
initiatives that were under attack were mostly related to government operated projects 
like electric power plants. An example for such attacks can be the PKK attack of Silvan 
Dam Construction site by detonating bombs placed in culvert in May 2015, when 
luckily no casualties were registered (Haber 7, 2015). Other attacks during the last years 
were mostly linked to specific political events like the Kobane conflict in Syria, or 
current parliament elections. Moreover, the targets of such attacks were such state 
facilities as municipality or schools (Haber 7 2013, Hürriyet 2014) with few reports on 
attacks on private sector establishments.  
We may explain such situation if we refrain from using discrete notions of peace 
and conflict and allow for some middle values between them. Then, the discussed above 
dynamics may suggest that the governmental investments indeed were perceived as a 
risk of decrease of the rebels’ bargaining power. Therefore, the rebels were likely to 
engage on attacks against such programs. At the same time as increase of private 
investment in the region created opportunity costs for rebels, thus preventing outburst of 
conflict. Apparently as such balance between risks losing bargaining power (i.e. 
legitimacy) and opportunity costs induced by investments will be kept; the current state 
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of no-conflict may persist. However, as such situation is not a stable equilibrium and the 
reliable commitment problem persists, some policies such as promotion of CSR 
programs implemented by enterprises or policies to increase positive externalities would 
be necessary to keep the peace under the increasing rates of redistribution/public 
investments (as suggested by the examination of redistribution rates and legitimacy 
changes as continuous variables), or reversely, in case of economic decay in private 
sector, the redistribution/public investment rates may be decreased and such activities 
may be delegated to non-governmental actors in order to decreased the perceived risks. 
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CHAPTER 6.  
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
Though rational models provide possibility to analyze different phenomena in 
different contexts, the need for simplification of such phenomena may let to omission of 
some important contextual differences. This model is not exceptional in this sense as it 
requires one to simplify complex post-conflict settings to three-actor interaction. We 
also acknowledge that the real life circumstances are complicated by additional 
concerns of the conflicting parties, influences of other external and domestic factors, 
and possible fragmentations and new concerns within themselves. However, we argue 
that if other such conditions are constant, this model can provide an explanation for the 
direction of the possible impact of foreign direct investment on the peace building.  
Another weakness of the model may be rooted in the difficulty of its falsification 
due to difficulty measuring and comparing de facto preferences of the parties. However, 
the model still provides an insight into the direction in which the process will move 
under the particular circumstances.  
We also should acknowledge that the model approaches all the post-conflict 
situations as similar with particular balance of power, while in practice each post-
conflict situation may have different levels of risks of conflict recurrence, different 
levels of economic, political and social risks. Thus there is a possibility that the strength 
of FDI effects predicted this model may also vary from case to case. Therefore, in order 
to test this model in real life situations such risk related characteristics of a country 
should be accounted for. Moreover, differences in conflict proneness between the 
countries may lead to a selectivity bias when comparing countries which received FDI 
and those which did not. Such selectivity bias can occur due to the possibility that 
foreign investors a priori prefer countries with lower risks. In order to tackle such 
problem in turn it can be helpful to use controls for the factors attracting FDI inflows, 
economic and political characteristics of the countries and their risk proneness.
12
     
                                                          
12 The possibility of similar selectivity bias in studies on post-conflict peacebuilding is addressed by Fortna (2004) in 
the quantitative analysis of the effect of peacekeeping operations on the duration of peace. In order to prevent such 
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Defining the conditions in which foreign investment can contribute to or harm 
the post-conflict peace building is crucial as economic needs in most post-conflict 
countries are urgent while the peace in such circumstances is very fragile and may be 
easily destructed. Our model presents an explanation for why sometimes investment 
although providing the urgently needed finances for states may actually unwillingly 
cause renewal of war and suffer own losses, and why even sometimes such seemingly 
pro-peace state practices as redistribution and public investment in development of a 
disputed region may in reality result in new violence. We argue that while the most 
sustainable and beneficial for the long lasting peace conditions are likely to emerge 
when FDI brings large positive economic externalities and is complemented by 
redistributive policies of the state, and when population values such economic 
externalities more than the state’s redistribution.  
Alternatively truce may be still sustained when government does not provide 
redistributive policies but receives high revenues from the foreign investors, and when 
government values such revenues higher than the possible decrease of its legitimacy 
over the disputed territory. However, it is necessary to underline again that though in 
the short run truce will hold, the latent conflict in the region will be simmering, the 
grievances of the local population will be rising and the support for rebels offering 
alternative arrangements will increase. Such situation in turn can lead to loss of 
governmental control over the region in the long run or renewal of violence sparked by 
any additional factor.     
In contrast and rather surprisingly redistribution of revenues accrued from the 
FDI seems to be likely to lead to recurrence of violence. The reason for such outcome is 
the competition for legitimacy between the state and the rebels. Thus provision of new 
services and public investments from the central government may endanger positions of  
the rebels if they do not have a say in the allocation of such resources, and thus may 
motivate rebels to continue conflict in order not to have to reduce own demands. 
However, we do not propose that the government should not redistribute the 
revenues at all. Alternative models, estimating the range of peace-allowing changes in 
legitimacy, showed that there is some flexibility in the rates of redistribution. Moreover, 
these models has shown that with increase of positive externalities of FDI and presence 
                                                                                                                                                                          
bias the author firstly controls for the factors that can determine entrance of peacekeeprs and the level of ‘difficulty to 
maintain peace’(Fortna, 2004).  
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of corporate responsibility programs conducted by foreign companies, such flexibility 
of changes of legitimacy (dependent on the rate of redistribution) is higher. Thus 
policies aimed at promoting CSR programs, limiting negative externalities of 
investment and fostering positive externalities of investment are likely to broaden the 
scope of changes of legitimacy tolerable by the rebels and, thus, would help government 
to consolidate own power in the region without endangering peace.  
Such findings lead to several for policy recommendations. First of all, this 
finding shows that although provision of public services and investments is usually seen 
as a tool to strengthen peace and stability (UNDESA 2010), the question of who, how 
and to what extent provides the goods may be decisive for sustenance of peace.  It is 
important to prevent the change in the initial balance between the state and the rebels 
and thus not to create a commitment problem, and at the same time to improve 
conditions of the contested population and thus prevent their grievances. For such a 
purpose the state may use alternative models of service provision such as Independent 
Service Authority boards of which can include representative from different parts of 
society and thus solve the problem of legitimacy competition (Collier 2009). An 
alternative solution for such problem can be delegation of some financial resources 
management on local/regional level what also will reduce the resentment against the 
central government.  
At the same time considering the investors, they are more likely to sustain peace 
if their investments produce large and positive economic externalities highly valued by 
the local population.  For this end investors might be more interested in engaging in 
manufacture related project or to allocate special funds for community capacity building 
projects.  
Finally, although another equilibrium of not redistribution strategy is likely to be 
peace, the governments of post-conflict countries may be interested in shifting from 
such truce period into the Redistribution - Comply stage in order to make their truce 
more sustainable.  
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